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Sino-Japanese Trade in the Post-Normalization Era
by David Leng* & Shao-chuan Leng**
The passage of the Sino-Japanese Long- Term Trade Agreement
in early 1978, followed closely by the signing of a Peace and Friend-
ship Treaty, has resulted in a virtual explosion of trade between the
two nations. The authors examine the current results flowing from
this recent expansion in dealings between the People's Republic of
China and Japan, with special emphasis on the importance of pre-
existing ideological and technological differences in the agreement-
negotiating process. The authors conclude with an examination of
the future impact of both agreements, in terms of their foreseeable
effect on global trade and competition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T PON THE NORMALIZATION of the diplomatic relations be-
tween Japan the the People's Republic of China (PRC) on
September 29, 1972, a new era in Sino-Japanese trade was ushered in.
Immediately the amount of two-way trade climbed to around $1.1
billion in 1972,' zooming to $3.3 billion in 1974 and $3.8 billion in
1975,2 before plummeting to $3,033,483 in 1976 and then recovering
to reach $3,485,987 in 1977.3 Prospects for 1978 are extraordinarily
favorable with figures on the first half of the year showing Sino-
Japanese trade at $2,138,808, an all-time high for such a period. 4
The volume of Sino-Japanese trade over the last six years has been
strongly influenced, as has all of the PRC's commercial activity, by
domestic unrest and the vicissitudes of an internal ideological conflict.
This article proposes to examine the fluctuations in Sino-Japanese
trading patterns in the 1972 to 1978 period, with the focus first on the
structure and nature of the trade before the signing of the Sino-
Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement in February of 1978, and then
on the explosion in this trade since the Long-Term Trade Agreement,
which appropriately coincided with the signing of the Sino-Japanese
Peace and Friendship Treaty in August of 1978. Great attention will
be devoted to the shift in the PRC's thinking from a more doctrinaire
form of "self-reliance" championed by the "Gang of Four," Mao Tse-
tung's putative heirs, to the pragmatism of the Chou En-lai and Teng
Hsiao-ping political philosophy exemplified by its "Four Moderniza-
tions" program and the desire to import vast quantities of foreign
technology.
In view of its crucial role in the Long-Term Trade Agreement, the
future of the PRC's oil industry will be considered along with the still
festering dispute between China and Japan over the potentially rich
petroleum deposits in the East China Sea around the Tiao Yu-t'ai (also
called Senkaku) Islands. Another indispensable element in the Long-
Term Trade Agreement, the Japanese exportation of industrial plants
and equipment to the PRC, will be scrutinized, especially those dif-
Tsuchiya, Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Trade, 38 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 240 (1973).
2 G. HsIAO, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA: POLICY, LAW AND PRACTICE 59
(1977).
' CHINA NEWSLETTER 16 (April 1978) (published by the Japan External Trade
Organization).
4 Id. at 32 (September 1978).
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ficulties encountered in the transfer of technology, such as developed
by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) of the multilateral Con-
sultative Group (CG), and the question of patent rights. Other key
commodities in Sino-Japanese trade also will merit some discussion. A
further topic of investigation will be the various methods the Chinese
will employ to finance their extensive import program.
II. RECENT TRENDS IN THE PRC's FOREIGN TRADE
The PRC's foreign trade picture has been characterized by "the
rapid expansion of the 1950's, the slowdown of the 1960's, and the era
of resurgence, of the 1970's."I Forced to retrench in the 1960's in the
face of the ideological split with the Soviet Union, and the domestic
anarchy generated by the Cultural Revolution, Chinese trade dropped
in net volume from the previous decade. In contrast, 1970 through
1976 saw the value of the PRC's foreign trade grow more than twenty
percent a year in terms of current prices.6 Between 1970 and 1975, in-
dustrial output increased at an estimated annual rate of ten percent, 7
while in dollar value, China's foreign trade increased from $4.72
billion in 1971 to $14.32 billion in 1975.8 Purchases from the in-
dustrialized Western countries, including Japan, accelerated in value
from $1.221 billion in 1970 to $4.591 billion by 1975, with Western
imports comprising 63.7% of the Mainland's total imports that year.9
This quadrupling of trade activity with the West and the general
improvement in economic productivity occurred at a time when Chou
En-lai's plea for "modernization" and an end to China's self-imposed
isolationism began to have significant impact. But abruptly in 1976,
China experienced a drastic slump in economic activity. According to
one estimate, the dollar amount of the PRC's foreign trade fell to be-
tween $13.1 and $13.4 billion in 1976, a drop of six to eight percent
from the 1975 figures.' 0 In its burst of enthusiasm to develop more ties
with the outside world, Peking had managed to build up a trade
deficit of almost $1.5 billion in the 1973 to 1975 period. Of particular
importance in this deficit was the Japanese accumulation of a surplus
' Chou, The Pattern of China's Trade, 75 CURRENT HIST. 65 (1978).
6 Id.
' Chen, The Chinese Economy in the 1970s: Performances, Problems and Pros-
pects, in POST-MAO CHINA AND U.S.-CHINA TRADE 36 (S. Leng ed. 1977).
' Hsia, China's Foreign Trade and the "Gang of Four," in POST-MAO CHINA AND
U.S.-CHINA TRADE 96 (S. Leng ed. 1977).
Morrison, Domestic Politics and Industrialization in China: The Foreign Trade
Factor, 18 ASIAN SURVEY 687, 691-92 (1978).
10 Hsia, supra note 8, at 93.
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approaching $730 million by the end of 1975.11 One can view 1976 as
the year in which the Chinese leadership attempted to restore a
favorable trade situation, since a negative trade balance is an
anathema to the PRC, indicating undue dependence on foreign
powers. Also, in practical terms, the reduction in imports in 1976 was
"necessary to provide the PRC a breathing spell during which to ab-
sorb the massive purchases of the previous years."' 2 China's economic
slowdown in 1976 was exacerbated by the horror of the Tangshan earth-
quake in July of 1976, which had a traumatic effect on overall produc-
tivity. The Tangshan catastrophe ruined coal production at Kailuan,
the chief source of coking coal for the steel industry. A decline in steel
output meant that the Japanese were able to purchase in 1976 only
about 3.5 million tons of steel products as opposed to the original
prediction of six million tons.1 3 Finally, the atmosphere of domestic in-
stability, which was climaxed in October by the purge of the Gang of
Four, contributed greatly to China's poor economic performance in
1976. In any event, Japan's exports to the PRC in 1976 fell 26.4%
below 1975, and its imports from the PRC suffered a corresponding
decline of 10.5%. 14
Chinese economic growth surged upward in 1977 with industrial
production increasing by fourteen percent over 1976 levels.' 5 Some
comparisons help highlight the degree of industrial recovery in 1977:
Iron and steel production reached twenty-three million tons versus
slightly below twenty-one million tons in 1976; 443 million tons of coal
were mined in 1976, compared to 500 million tons the next year; and
petroleum output rose from eighty-six million tons in 1976 to ninety-
three million tons in 1977.16
Sino-Japanese trade in 1977 was characterized by a sluggish and
discouraging first half and a remarkable upturn in the second half,
especially in Japan's exports. The two-way trade totalled only $1.5
billion in the January to June period, a ten percent decline even from the
first half of 1976.' Trying to rectify the unfavorable trade balance with
Japan, China's imports from Japan were reduced by a staggering 26.2%
" ORIENTAL EcONOMIST, November 1976, at 23.
12 Hsia, supra note 8, at 94.
1" See ORIENTAL ECONOMIST. November 1976, at 23.
14 CHINA NEWSLETTER 16 (April 1978).
1s Prybyla, Chinese Industry Shaping Up, 75 CURRENT HIST. 61, 79 (1978).
'6 CHINA NEWSLETTER 30 (September 1978).
11 Id. at 4 (October 1977).
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from the first half of 1976, while its exports increased 17.6%.1 8
By the end of 1977, the Sino-Japanese bilateral trade had grown 14.9%
over 1976 with imports from Japan up 16.6% (about $1.94 billion), an
extraordinary recovery considering the first half drop of 26.2%.
Japanese imports also were up 12.9% to $1.547 billion, the highest
figure ever reached in Sino-Japanese trade. 9
Despite a positive change from the gloomy figures of 1976, the
PRC's total foreign trade volume in 1977 barely attained the level of
1975. Though the twelve percent increase in trade over 1976 was im-
pressive, the average annual growth rate in the years 1970 through
1975 was twenty-one percent. 20 Furthermore, contracts for complete
plant imports declined from $185 million in 1976 to only $59 million
in 1977.21 The preparatory phase initiating those complicated
economic adjustments required to increase the amount of future im-
ports began in 1977. Implementation of Peking's new expansionist
trade policies only gathered momentum later in the year, evidenced by
the great jump in the volume of Sino-Japanese trade in the second half
of 1977.
Of course, the first half of 1978 has seen an unprecedented growth
in Sino-Japanese trade, based on the terms of the Long-Term Trade
Agreement and bolstered by the signing of the Peace and Friendship
Treaty. Japan's exports recorded an all-time peak of $1,235.21 million,
improving 56.1% over the comparable 1977 period. 22 The period was
marked by substantial sales of iron and steel, coupled with a sharp rise
in machinery and equipment purchases by the PRC. Moreover,
Japanese imports from China also reached a record figure of $903.6
million, a 27.6% increase over the first half of 1977.2s It has been
estimated that in the first half of 1978 alone, the PRC committed itself
to more than five billion dollars worth of capital imports (plants and
equipment), while only approximately $2.78 billion in such imports
Is Id.
19 Id. at 9 (April 1978).
20 Yeh, Foreign Trade Under the Hua Regime: Poicy, Performance, and Pros-
pects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH SINO-AMERIcAN CONFERENCE ON MAINLAND
CHINA 2 (Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University ed. 1978).
21 Id. at 5.
22 CHINA NEWSLETTER 1 (September 1978).
23 Id. at 2. By the end of the third quarter the total volume was worth a little
more than $3.4 billion, an increase of 38.4% over the corresponding 1977 period with
Japan enjoying a significant $590.25 million surplus. Id. at 6 (December 1978).
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were ordered during the years 1973 through 1977. 4 Financing for this
buying spree has been facilitated by the PRC's accumulation of a trade
surplus of over two billion dollars during 1976 and 1977.25
III. IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRC's SHIFT IN
TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1970's
In view of the present government's modified and flexible inter-
pretation of self-reliance and modernization, the infatuation with
Western technology and economic organization has far-reaching im-
plications for Peking's foreign trade prospects. Although the PRC is
now eager for Western assistance, it has not abandoned completely its
own particular version of economic development. Self-reliance, in the
eyes of the Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng regime, still means a
fundamental preference for domestic products over imports.
Imports are to be confined to commodities essential to national
security, to economic development or to the subsistence of the peo-
ple; they do not include non-essential consumer goods. The primary
objective of PRC exports is to finance necessary imports rather than
to augment employment or the growth of the domestic economy.'6
Foreign trade is just a means to an end-a necessary evil enabling
China to chart a course of independent economic growth. One indica-
tion of how rapidly Chinese thinking is changing is some preliminary
evidence that Peking has even decided to import consumer items as a
way of raising the standard of living and providing the people with
more types of material incentives.' 7
The Chinese modernization entails a "shift away from do-it-
yourself, local labor-intensive, low-skill industrialization toward large,
capital and skill-intensive, technologically advanced complexes" 28 with
priority given to heavy industry. Re-focusing its policy of technical
24 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., October 6, 1978, at 45.
21 CHINA NEWSLETTER 9 (April 1978). See also FAR EAST. EcON. REv., July 7,
1978, at 34, stating that Peking's foreign reserves in light of these surpluses now were
valued at around four and five billion dollars divided about equally between gold and
hard currency.
26 Chou, supra note 5, at 66.
21 FAR EAST. EcON. REV., September 15, 1978, at 65-66. There was a relaxation
of import restrictions on luxury items such as cameras, televisions and watches
although they are still subject to heavy import duties.
28 Prybyla, supra note 15, at 64. For a description of China's "Four Moderniza-
tions" program, see NEWSWEEK, November 20, 1978, at 70.
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dualism known as "walking on two legs," the PRC has moved from the
indigenous "leg" of technology, commonly referred to as "appropriate
technology," to the "leg" of borrowing technology from more highly
developed societies. This Chinese emphasis is ironic because the cur-
rent mood in many other developing nations favors concentrating on
"appropriate technology," since it is considered less imitative and more
responsive to each individual country's unique social, political and
economic environment. Peking's present form of modernization has as
its inspirational and doctrinal source Chou En-lai's report to the
Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, outlining two
stages of development for China. Before 1980, China is to have "an in-
dependent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic
system" in order for the country to take its place among the global
powers. The second stage requires "the comprehensive modernization
of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and
• "29
technology.
Teng Hsiao-ping was a fervent disciple of Chou's Four Moderniza-
tions program, but he was ousted from power in April of 1976, shortly
after Chou's death, by the radical Maoist elements led by the Gang of
Four. For a brief period from April through October of 1976, the
Gang of Four promoted the dominance of the "red" over the "expert"
factions in Chinese politics. Their opening salvo directed against the
moderate forces symbolized by Teng was a February 6, 1976 People's
Daily editorial, lambasting Teng for endeavoring to subvert the legacy
of the Cultural Revolution.30 Teng was ridiculed for forsaking the
masses, since he assigned no prominent place in his modernization
plans to the creative will of the people. He was accused of squandering
China's precious raw materials and exchanging them for high-priced
capitalist goods, thereby relegating China to semi-colonial status once
again.31 Indiscriminately importing "foreign things," according to
Study and Criticism, a Shanghai mouthpiece of the Gang of Four,
would only lead to a deplorable state of a/ffairs in which the PRC
would "become nothing more than a market where the capitalists
could dump their goods, a source for their raw materials, a repair and
assembly facility for them, somewhere they could invest for huge pro-
fits .. . "12
29 Chen, supra note 7, at 30-31.
10 Morrison, supra note 9, at 692.
31 ORIENTAL EcONOMIST, May 1976, at 3.
12 Morrison, supra note 9, at 694-95.
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Especially virulent were the radicals' denunciations of Teng's so-
called "Twenty Points" philosophy, which had been expressed in a
report entitled, "Some Problems in Conjunction with the Quickening
of the Development of Industry." Under the tutelage of Teng, this
document was supposedly drafted by such eminent Communist Party
officials as Li Hsien-nien and Yu Chiu-li in August and September of
1975.3s It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Twenty Points is "as
succint and cogent a case for economic development . . as has
emerged from the PRC. ' '3 4 Twin goals were proposed in the Twenty
Points; the large-scaled adoption of foreign technology, and a cor-
responding increase in mineral exports to help defray the high costs of
importing such advanced technology. Contained in the Twenty Points
was a description of "product payback," a novel financing mechanism:
In order to hasten the exploration of our coal and petroleum, it
is possible that on the condition of equality and mutual benefit, and
in accordance with accepted practices of international trade such as
deferred and installment payments, we [the Chinese] may sign long-
term contracts with foreign countries and fix several production sites
where they will supply complete sites of modern equipment required
by us, and we will pay for them with the coal and oil we produce.35
The principles underlying this exchange scheme were to reemerge
within the context of the Sino-Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement.
Following Mao's death the reversal of the radicals' positions began
almost immediately upon the arrest of the Gang of Four and the
designation of Hua Kou-feng as Communist Party Chairman in
October 1976. Suddenly, foreign trade was praised as an integral part
of China's economic activity. Serving as ready-made scapegoats, the
Gang of Four were blamed for all of the country's economic woes. Ac-
cording to Hua, their xenophobia and total rejection of needed foreign
assistance ended up costing the PRC, between 1974 and 1976, about
$61.3 billion in industrial output, twenty-eight million tons of steel and
around $24.5 billion in state revenues . 6 These alleged renegades were
charged with paralyzing China's foreign trade apparatus by behaving
arbitrarily and irrationally in decision-making positions while ignoring
central directives unsympathetic to their purposes.3 7 The Gang of Four
's CHINA NEWSLETTER 2 (October 1977).
14 Morrison, supra note 9, at 696.
11 Id. at 693-94.
36 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., March 17, 1978, at 42.
11 Hsia, supra note 8, at 99.
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also were viewed as the chief culprits in perverting the PRC's normal
commercial practices.
With a view to undermining our country's exports, the "gang of
four" also made a host of accusations and created confusion with
respect to pricing, trade practices, managerial procedures and many
other problems. When you improved the quality, variety, design and
packaging of export commodities in order to suit the customs and
habits and level of consumption of other countries and nations and to
meet the needs of the international market, they attacked you for
"waiting on the foreign bourgeosie."3 1
Accompanying this disturbing drop in quality was growing interna-
tional uneasiness over the reliability of Chinese products. In 1978, the
PRC was particularly anxious to arrest this trend of deterioration, for
it is clear that "without quality, products are merely a pile of junk and
the value of output is not worth a penny."3 9
Arguably the most damning indictment of the Gang of Four was
their malicious conspiracy to sabotage China's oil production
capabilities. They disrupted the State's oil allocation plans by falsely
diverting needed supplies away from outlying areas to Shanghai and
Liaoning Province. Additionally, they also were guilty of changing the
"coal-consuming enterprises into oil-consuming enterprises with the
ulterior motive of deliberately creating a situation in which there was
an urgent need for oil."40
To buttress their counteroffensive against the Gang of Four the
moderates evoked the wisdom of the two icons of world communism,
Mao and Lenin. Reference was made to Mao's 1956 polemic, "On the
Ten Major Relationships," which extolled the virtues of tolerance and
open-mindedness in plotting China's course of economic development.
Selective importation of foreign technology was compatible with self-
reliance, since Mao believed that,
[O]ur policy is to learn from the strong points of all countries,
learn all that is generally good in the political, economic, scientific ,
and technological fields and in literature and art. But we must learn
with an analytical and critical eye, not blindly, and we must not copy
everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically.41
31 Id. at 100.
" Quoted from the Communist Party journal, Red Flag, reprinted in FAR EAST.
ECON. REv., August 11, 1978, at 86.
40 Hsia, supra note 8, at 98-99.
41 Morrison, supra note 9, at 700.
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Moreover, Mao's hoary principle, "Develop the Economy and Ensure
Supplies," first expressed in 1942, was utilized by Hua as a call for in-
creased production and economic growth which necessarily meant
more foreign commerce.4 2 As for Lenin's opinions, Peking went as far
as quoting with approval the infamous Stalin comments on Lenin's
viewpoint in 1921 when the Soviet Union was still a struggling infant
nation: "He [Lenin] recognized therefore at that time that the best
among all the feasible measures which would be taken was to attract
foreign capital, to use it for the development of industry." 43 Peking
Review, in its October 13, 1978 issue asserted that "[s]cience and
technology have no class nature," and cited Lenin, who conceded that
in restoring the Soviet economy, "we should not grudge the capitalist a
little extra profit if only we can effect this restoration." 44
At the l1th Chinese Party Congress, held in August 1977, the
preamble of the new party code accepted the four modernizations pro-
gram as the basic guiding policy for China's economic development.' 5
Symbolically, this statement coincided with the return to power of
Teng, also in August of that year. Using the four modernizations as
their rallying cry, the Teng-Hua leadership convened the National
Finance and Trade Conference on Learning from Taching and Tachai
in Peking from June 20 to July 9, 1978. Specific appeal was made to
the masses for their support and participation in this new "Long
March.' 8'  Both Hua and Li Hsien-nien further catalogued the
economic harm and corruption caused by the excesses of the Gang of
Four. Hua acknowledged the importance of the proper use of the "law
of value," an euphemistic term for profit. Running businesses for per-
sonal gain had been regarded by the radicals as "putting profits in
command," and they had instead adhered to the "reactionary view
that it was glorious to run an enterprise at a loss."' ' 7 Such an
unenlightened attitude made it extremely difficult to live up to Mao's
adage of "developing the economy and ensuring supplies," since no in-
dividual incentives to produce were recognized. Economic growth
could now be crucially abetted by foreign trade, because in Li's color-
ful biological analogy, "Just as a person cannot survive without the cir-
culation of blood, so our socialist economy cannot for a moment
42 PEKING REV., July 28, 1978, at 8-9.
41 FAR EAST. EcON. REV., September 22, 1978, at 35.
,4 PEKING REV., October 13, 1978, at 13.
41 CHINA NEWSLETrER 1 (October 1977).
46 PEKING REV., July 28, 1978, at 3.
41 Id. at 11.
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operate without financial and trade work, the exchange of com-
modities or the allocation of funds." 41 Foreign trade is a lifeline in
maintaining the PRC's economic health, underscoring Peking's new
tacit admission that the world has become an interdependent
marketplace.
An important argument advanced by the Teng-Hua moderates for
importing technology is the pressing timetable for modernization.
China cannot afford any more delays although "the Chinese people
can certainly make scientific and technological inventions and crea-
tions as well as foreigners and may even surpass them in some respects
... . There is a problem of racing against time, for speed." 4 While
somewhat defensive in tone, this praise of the Chinese innate talent for
scientific originality and discovery has been an important psychological
theme during the present period of headlong assimilation of Western
technology. To positively reinforce their self-image the Chinese have
subscribed to a cyclical view of technological progress:
Science and technology are wealth created by all mankind. Every
nation, every country must learn the strong points and advanced
science and technology from other countries. The better one learns,
the bigger the progress. China's four inventions of ancient time-
papermaking, printing, gunpowder and the compass-were new
techniques which many countries took over and used. .... 50
There is an historical linkage and continuity in technological develop-
ment; China has a rich heritage of scientific achievement which it gave
the "barbarian" West; now it is only fitting and fair for China to be
paid back.
Significantly, Japan was suggested as a paradigm for the PRC's
development strategy. The Japanese policy of obtaining foreign patent
rights and molding the technology to suit their own special
requirements contributed mightily to their economic miracle by
transforming Japan's industrial infrastructure almost overnight. 5 1 Such
unabashed admiration for the Japanese modernization experience cer-
tainly was an important impetus behind the revolution in Sino-
Japanese trade relations in 1978. On his visit to Japan in October of
1978 to sign the Peace and Friendship Treaty, Teng declared that his
primary purpose was to "learn from the . . . Japanese people."' 2 In
48 Id. at 16.
4 ! Hsia, supra note 8, at 101.
So PEKING REv., October 13, 1978, at 11.
51 Id.
12 Wash. Post, October 30, 1978, § A, at 18.
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addition, there is a natural historical and cultural affinity binding the
two countries together.
In Japan the Chinese find lessons in efficiency and enterprise not
so tainted by the rugged individualism they find so distasteful in the
West. Japan suggests a way to build modern factories without losing
too much of traditional arts and a way to borrow from the West
without being controlled by it. Japan offers economic vitality without
immense income differences or social schisms. It insists on a respect
for elderly leaders that sits well with China's current gerontocracy. 53
A practical catalyst for the enormous broadening of Sino-Japanese
economic ties in 1978 was the ambitious Ten Year Development Plan
unveiled by Hua at the 5th National People's Congress held from
February 26 to March 5, 1978. Originally written in the summer of
1975, this plan was temporarily shelved because of the machinations of
the Gang of Four. Therefore, the Plan encompassed the period 1976 to
1985 by also absorbing the Fifth (1976-80) and Sixth Five Year Plans
(1981-85). 5 4 Designed to make the goals of the four modernizations
campaign a reality by the end of this century, the Ten Year Develop-
ment Plan fixed some very grandiose economic targets. In the area'of
basic construction, 120 major projects were envisioned, including ten
iron and steel plants, nine nonferrous metal plants, eight coal mines,
ten oil and gas fields, thirty power plants, six new railroad lines, and
five ports and harbors. Investments in these new projects were to be
equivalent to all such similar expenditures made in the past twenty-
eight years. Industrial production was, supposed to expand at an an-
nual rate of over ten percent, agricultural growth was set at four to
five percent a year with food output to reach 400 million tons annual-
ly, and mechanization of agriculture was to cover eighty-five percent of
all farming tasks. In the realm of science and technology, 800,000
scientists were to be trained, while several centers for scientific ex-
perimentation were to be coordinated into a nationwide research
system.55
On March 18, 1978, Fang Yi, the minister in charge of the State
Scientific and Technology Commission, delivered a speech at the
National Science Conference delineating in more detail the technical
needs of the country. He listed twenty-seven critical fields of
53 Id.
14 CHINA NEWSLETTER 21-22 (September 1978).
15 For other details of the Ten Year Plan, see id. and FAR EAST. EcON. REV.,
March 17, 1978, at 41-42.
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technological development with 108 key projects, while also confessing
that China was lagging fifteen to twenty years behind the world leaders
in many areas.5 6 To even partially fulfill the economic directives of the
Ten Year Development Plan and the aspirations outlined by Fang Yi,
Chinese demands for more sophisticated industrial imports took on
great urgency, heightening their interest in concluding a long-term
trade agreement with Japan.
IV. MECHANISMS FOR SINO-JAPANESE TRADE ESTABLISHED BEFORE
THE LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENT
After normalization, the vehicle for semi-official trade was still the
"Japan-China memorandum trade" (M-T trade) which had been an-
nually renewed starting in 1968. Though theoretically distinct from
"friendly trade," M-T trade had become increasingly politicized, with
contracts signed under its aegis forced to explicitly accept a whole
array of Chinese preconditions. s5
However, M-T trade was superseded on January 5, 1974, by the
first truly bilateral governmental trade pact, the Japan-China Trade
Agreement. Under the terms of this three year agreement the countries
were given reciprocal most favored nation status, provision was made
for payment arrangements using yen or yuan or other convertible cur-
rencies, a yearly joint government trade committee meeting was set up,
and a pledge was made to promote general technical cooperation." By
being granted most favored nation treatment the tariffs on the PRC's
exports to Japan were cut in half and the duty imposed by the PRC on
Japanese items slashed by one-third.5 9 Although it was a more promis-
U.S.-CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1978, at 3-4.
s7 Leng, 8ino-Japanese Trade, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 780, 787 (1973).
Besides recognizing the nonseparation of political and economic matters, Japanese
traders had to adopt Chou En-lai's "three political principles": (1) a friendly posture
towards Peking; (2) the denial of the concept of "two Chinas"; and (3) support for the
normalization of relations between China and Japan. Id. at 782-83. Japan-China
Memorandum Trade trade was further burdened with four requirements laid down by
Chou in April of 1970. The PRC would not trade with chose Japanese companies,
which "helped" Taiwan and South Korea, invested in Taiwan and South Korea, aided
in the United States war effort in Indochina, or were affiliated with American in-
terests. Id. at 794.
s' See Tsuchiya, supra note 1, at 243; Kim, Sino-Japanese Commercial Rela-
tions, in CHINA: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMY 613 (Joint Economic Committee of
the United States Congress ed. 1975).
59 Tsuchiya, supra note 1, at 245.
Vol. 11:267
SINO-JAPANESE TRADE
ing device for encouraging trade expansion, the January 1974 pact had
some disturbing omissions, no procedure was outlined for the entry of
Japanese businessmen into China, and their legal standing while in
China was left obscure. Probably most damaging was the PRC failure
to protect or respect Japanese patent rights.6 0
Besides the main trade pact, ancillary agreements were entered in-
to by Peking and Tokyo covering the topics of aviation (April 20,
1974), navigation (November 13, 1974) and fishing (August 15, 1975).
The air transport agreement opened up routes between the PRC and
Japan with JAL (Japan Airlines) obtaining landing rights at Peking
and/or Shanghai, and CAAC (the Civil Aviation Administration of
China) flying to Tokyo and/or Osaka; the navigation accord permitted
Chinese and Japanese ships to service both countries on a regular
basis. 6' An interesting feature of these two agreements was the
diplomatic flexibility exhibited by Peking when dealing with the net-
tlesome question of Taiwan. CAL (China Airlines) continued flying to
Japan while using the Nationalist flag and emblem. In order to ap-
pease the PRC, Japan invented the "legal fiction" that such markings
were only for private identification purposes and not a manifestation of
the State of Taiwan. 62 Similarly, under the provisions of the navigation
agreement, Taiwan's vessels were allowed to continue to bear the
Nationalist flag.63 Negotiations over fishing rights were quite pro-
tracted, as both sides became mired in extremely technical discussions
involving, for example, the size of net meshes and the horsepower of
boat engines. On the main bone of contention, the PRC's wish to
establish a military guard line to protect its fishing fleet, the Chinese
finally acquiesced."
Both parties were required to specify the commodities to be ex-
changed under the conditions of the 1974 Trade Agreement. Still ex-
isting outside the ambit of this agreement was the Canton fair system
deeply intertwined with the "friendly firm" trade. "Friendly firms"
were those Japanese companies recommended to Peking as ideological-
ly sympathetic to its aims, i.e., opposed to the government of Taiwan.
They were given preferential consideration in trade negotiations. Using
the Canton fair as their main bargaining site, these privileged institu-
tions lasted until March of 1973, when the whole system of favoritism
60 Kim, supra note 58, at 613.
6, G. HSIAO, supra note 2, at 62.
62 Id.
61 Id. at 62-63.
64 Halpern, China and Japan Since Normalization, in DIMENSIONS OF CHINA'S
FOREIGN RELATIONS 114 (C.T. Hsueh ed. 1977).
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was abolished. 6" While the subjective grounds on which "friendly
firms" operated were eliminated, the Canton fair remained an impor-
tant supplemental channel for Sino-Japanese trade. This semiannual
event is held once in the Spring (April 15 to May 15) and again in the
Fall (October 15 to November 15).66 As a reciprocal gesture, the PRC
has held fairs in Japan on two separate occasions since normalization;
in 1974 the first fair was in Tokyo and Osaka, while in 1977 an exhibi-
tion toured Nagoya, Sapporo and KitaKyushu. 61
The amount of Sino-Japanese trade carried out through the fairs
has declined in significance with the opening up of more diversified
trade outlets such as direct liaisons with the PRC's state trading cor-
porations and contact with the many Chinese trade missions abroad.6,
Roughly one-third of China's total export trade was handled by the
fairs in 1977, but at the Spring 1978 Canton fair $280 million worth of
Sino-Japanese business was conducted; a substantial drop from the
estimated $350 million transacted at the previous Fall's fair.69 In that
each Canton fair still contributes about a ten percent share of the total
yearly volume in Sino-Japanese trade,7 0 they do remain vital entry
points, especially for smaller Japanese firms.
Given the scope and magnitude of the recently signed Long-Term
Trade Agreement, a majority of the giant Japanese corporations will
probably commit most of their future efforts to satisfying its goals, thus
further demarcating the nature of Sino-Japanese commerce. The fairs
will become increasingly the forum for those more modest-sized
Japanese businesses excluded from the purview of the Long-Term
Trade Agreement. From the present perspective of Chinese
pragmatism, the fairs continue to be valuable instruments for scientific
cooperation and exchange. Through the fairs system the Japanese have
inexpensive opportunities to showcase their new products, and the
PRC can painlessly keep current on all the new technological
developments. 7
05 CHINA NEWSLETTER 4 (June 1978).
66 Tsuchiya, supra note 1, at 244. Other regional fairs are held on an irregular
basis throughout China.
07 CHINA NEWSLETTER 19-24 (January 1978).
68 FAR EAST. EcON. REV., June 2, 1978, at 52.
69 Id. at 53-54.
10 Id. at 54.
"' See Heymann, Self-Reliance Revisited: China's Technology Dilemma, 10 STAN.
J. INT'L STUD. 15 (1975), where the author deals with the Chinese practice of both
studying the foreign models on display, and also manufacturing their own products
based on the technology copied from the foreign prototypes.
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V. THE LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENT
OF FEBRUARY 16, 1978
A. Preliminary Negotiations
In late March and early April of 1977, negotiations on the Sino-
Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement (LTTA) were initiated when a
delegation representing Keidanren (the Association of Economic
Organizations), regarded commonly as the most powerful business
group in Japan, visited China. Even though Toshiwo Doko, the presi-
dent of Keidanren, ostensibly headed the mission, the actual negotia-
tions were conducted by Yoshihiro Inayama, who was a vice-president
of Keidanren, and more importantly, the chairman of the Japan-China
Association on Economy and Trade, the original proponent of a long-
term agreement. It was determined that while Inayama would be the
chief Japanese spokesman, Lin Hsi-wen, a vice-minister of foreign
trade, would be the main negotiator for the Chinese. 72 Details of the
agreement were left open-ended, but the Chinese did indicate a will-
ingness to export oil and coal and specifically mentioned a proposal
made by Mr. Inayama in 1974 committing the Japanese to purchase
fifty million tons of petroleum five years after the signing of a long-
term agreement.7"
As momentum for the trade agreement began to build, the
Japanese formed the Provisional Committee for the Japan-China Long-
Term Trade Agreement, consisting of influential figures in the
Japanese business community, in an attempt to expedite matters with
the hope of signing an agreement by the end of 1977.1 4 The political
clout of this lobbying organization can be easily measured. The
presidents of Nippon Steel, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Bank
of Tokyo chaired subcommittees. In his capacity as chairman of the
Promotional Committee, the ubiquitous Mr. Inayama met again with Lin
Hsi-wen on September 26 and 30, 1977. The talks were most prof-
itable. Basic understanding was then reached concerning the trade
pact's overall framework.75 A Japanese draft of the agreement was
hammered out at a November 22 session of the Promotional Committee in
12 CHINA NEWSLETTER 17-19 (October 1977).
I1 d. at 17. Regarding imports, the PRC suggested that the most urgent needs
for equipment and plants were in the following areas: coal mining; transportation;port
and harbor facilities; oil drilling; petrochemicals; and the metallurgical and power
generation industries.
14 CHINA NEWSLETTER 2 (January 1978).
75 Id. at 3-4.
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anticipation of the next round of negotiations, which commenced
on November 25 and lasted until November 30.76
At these November sessions, the PRC's long-range target for oil
exports was set at fifteen million tons when Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
personally guaranteed that China was capable of exporting this quanti-
ty." The Japanese were further relieved when it was agreed that
Shengli and Hua-pei brands of crude oil were to be exported along
with the traditional staple of China's oil industry, Taching crude. It
was speculated that these types of crudes were more suitable for
Japanese markets, because they were "lighter" in composition than the
"heavy," low-gravity Taching variety.
Unfortunately, in November no consensus could be reached on the
amounts of ordinary coal (used mainly for electrical power generation
purposes) to be exported by the PRC. The Japanese insisted on a
figure of 1.1 million tons in 1982 after an initial shipment of 150,000
to 200,000 tons in the first year of the agreement, while the Chinese
remained adamant about supplying 500,000 tons in 1978 and two
million tons in 1982.78 Discord also marked the two sides' views on the
exportation of coking coal (for iron and steel factories); the Japanese
wanted to start accepting one million tons in 1982 with five million
tons as a long-term goal, but the Chinese strenuously insisted on ex-
porting coking coal from 1978 onwards. 9
B. Terms of the LTTA
Such negotiating obstacles may have contributed to the delays in
concluding the LTTA, but February 16, 1978 was not far off the pro-
jected 1977 deadline. Technically, the agreement was signed by two
consultative committees having no official mandate, but as expressed
in the preamble, the pact had the full support and blessing of both
governments. 8
"0 Id. at 5-6. In the November meeting, Lin Hsi-wen informed the Japanese that
he was now also the head of a newly created nongovernmental body, the China-Japan
Long-Term Trade Council, which had been set up as a corresponding organization to
the Promotional Committee.
"1 Id. at 7.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 8.
" The text of the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Agreement does not appear to
have been published officially in English. The text of the agreement does appear in
English in CHINA NEWSLErTER 25 (June 1978). The agreement was signed in Peking on
February 16, 1978. N.Y. Times, February 17, 1978, at AIO, col. 1.
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Article 1 stipulated that the LTTA would run from 1978 through
1985, with each side undertaking to export ten billion dollars worth in
this eight year period. For the first five years, through 1982, Japan is
obligated to export about seven to eight billion dollars of technology
and industrial plants plus two to three billion dollars in construction
materials, machinery and equipment (article 2). In exchange, under
article 2, the Chinese are to export during these years oil and coal in
the following amounts:
Crude Oil Coking Coal Ordinary Coal
1978 7 million tons 150,000 to 300,000 tons 150,000 to 200,000 tons
1979 7.6 million tons 500,000 tons 150,000 to 200,000 tons
1980 8 million tons 1,000,000 tons 500,000 to 600,000 tons
1981 9.5 million tons 1,500,000 tons 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 tons
1982 15 million tons 2,000,000 tons 1,500,000 to 1,700,000 tons
The quotas for coal indicate how each side had compromised in
order to overcome the stumbling blocks encountered during the
November 1977 negotiations. For ordinary coal, the 1978 figure essen-
tially matches Japanese expectations, but the 1982 amount is much
closer to the Chinese goal of two million tons. As for coking coal,
Tokyo made the major concession- accepting this form of energy im-
mediately and also taking on double the quantity that had originally
been planned for 1982. On the issue of coking coal, Japanese com-
plaisance is particularly pronounced, because its capacity to absorb
metallurgical coal was limited by contractual commitments to other
foreign suppliers."A
According to article 2, the amounts of commodities to be exported
from 1983 through 1985 were to be determined in 1981. During these
last three years, China was additionally assured that its exportation of
oil and coal would only increase in quantity, with 1982 to be used as
the base year in calculations.
In very opaque terms article 3 of the LTTA called for Peking's im-
ports to be paid on a "deferred payment formula." Specific financial
terms, including appropriate interest rates, were to be negotiated later,
since the two parties had been unable to settle their differences.8 2
While not theoretically a "product payback" scheme, the intrinsic struc-
ture of the LTTA is very close in spirit to Teng's concept-
s' CHINA NEWSLETTER 8 (January 1978).
82 Id. at 2 Uune 1978).
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China's natural resources are to be bartered away for much needed in-
fusions of high technology. Unlike "product payback," nothing in the
LTTA requires that each import of Japanese industrial goods be
financed by a corresponding quantity of oil or coal; on the other hand,
the LTTA does not foreclose future application of this financing
method.
Under article 4, transactions under the LTTA were to be "con-
ducted on the basis of reasonable international prices and international
trade practices." Those onerous political conditions, formerly prere-
quisites for trade under the terms of M-T and "friendly firm" con-
tracts, have now been superseded by the objective standards of interna-
tional commerce-further evidence of the Chinese eagerness to ra-
tionalize its economic practices and extirpate ideological factors from
its development program.
In article 5, both sides were to extend technical cooperation and
provide for expanded economic exchange. Under article 8, each
signatory was to create a secretariat which would be entrusted with the
agreement's implementation; moreover, designated representatives were
to meet annually to iron out any difficulties. If a problem became in-
surmountable, arbitration would be instituted according to the pro-
cedures set forth in the Japan-China Trade Agreement of 1974.83
Finally, article 10 stated that "[c]ontracts concluded based on this
Agreement shall not be annulled unless by mutual consent of both
parties concerned." Once again the Chinese have adopted a principle
central to the proper enforcement of commercial law-the constraining
effect of contractual obligations prohibiting the unilateral repudiation
of such duties.
Conforming with established practice, LTTA contracts were to be
signed by individual Chinese trading corporations which possess their
own "legal personality." A state trading enterprise can be liable to the
extent of its assets, but its actions cannot bind other trading companies
or the Chinese government per se: "Although the corporations are
owned by the state the acts of the corporations are not acts of the
state. " 84 While the state cannot be held directly responsible for a
trading company defaulting on its obligations, the government will en-
sure that such an entity will not escape its commitments by being
either undercapitalized or going into bankruptcy.85
83 Id.
14 Heuser, Chinese Law of Foreign Trade: An Intervdew, 73 CHINA Q. 159, 163
(1978).
85 Id.
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In a revealing and informative interview in November of 1977, Jen
Chien-hsin, the director of the Legal Affairs Department of the China
Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, summarized the PRC's
current attitudes toward foreign trade. A policy of "independence and
initiative" and "equality and mutual benefit" was to be followed, in-
cluding consideration of customary standards in the area of foreign
trade law.86 This respect for the reasonable norms of international
commerce was provided for in article 4 of the LTTA. Possibly, this
new Chinese approach will help cure some of the procedural hardships
previously encountered in trading with Peking. When China purchased
goods in the past, the foreign seller was commonly forced to produce
an exhaustive and detailed package of shipping documents, but if China
was the seller, these requirements were either omitted or couched
in very vague general terms. Compiling these shipping documents was
a particularly laborious and difficult task, because Chinese inspectors
were fastidious and uncompromising in rejecting goods for the slightest
degree of nonconformity. 8 Another glaring inequity was the lack of
remedy for a breach of contract by the Chinese party, while, on the
other hand, the foreign signatory was usually covered by a breach of
contract clause. Specific performance was strongly preferred by the
Chinese over money damages as the remedy for a breach of contract
because,
there often exists a crucial relationship between a particular foreign
trade contract and the implementation of a carefully thought out
domestic economic project. Since the fulfillment of economic plans is
a matter of primary importance to the Chinese government, money
damages are often a poor substitute for the performance of a con-
tract. 88
Even though arbitration is possible under the LTTA, the Chinese
have shown great aversion towards its application. Informal mediation
and negotiation has always been favored over the more formal,
litigious nature of an arbitration proceeding. Contributing to this
dislike of arbitration has been the Chinese inclination towards the
remedy of specific performance. In an arbitration hearing, this alter-
native is normally foreclosed, since the respective positions of the two
parties tend to be frozen. 89 Like the rest of China's trading partners
86 Id. at 162.
87 Shaney, Selected Legal Aspects of China's Conduct of Foreign Trade, 11 INT'L
LAWYER 641, 648-49 (1977).
8 Id. at 652.
89 Id. at 653.
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the Japanese have not taken advantage of its prerogatives in the ar-
bitration area, and has instead chosen to absorb the losses without put-
ting in any claims.9 0 Under the LTTA, if arbitration is to be carried
out, the Chinese Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee (FTAC) must
be utilized. Usually each side in the dispute picks an arbitrator from
the FTAC's list of twenty-one members, and in turn, these two will
select a third person to act as a referee. 9' Jen Chien-hsin has stated
that the arbitrators, in their choice of law decision, are free to apply
China's, the foreign party's home country's, or even a third nation's
substantive law.9 2
C. The September Extension to the LTTA
Succumbing to the euphoria over the initial success of the LTTA,
negotiations to extend the pact were concluded on September 14, 1978
in Peking, by Toshio Komoto, the Japanese Minister of International
Trade and Industry, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on behalf of the
PRC. In the first six months of 1978, Japanese firms had contracted
for almost ten billion dollars worth of exports with the PRC, which
was equivalent to the total amount of Japanese exports contemplated
for the life of the February agreement. 93 In addition, more optimism
about the future of Sino-Japanese trade Was generated by the signing
in August 1978 of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.
In the September 14th modification of the original LTTA, the
following were the salient points of agreement: (1) the duration of the
LTTA was extended five more years from 1985 to 1990 with an
estimated $80 to $100 billion in trade planned for 1978 to 1990, com-
pared to the original projection of twenty billion dollars for the 1978
to 1985 period; (2) a regular ministerial-level conference was establish-
ed to discuss trade matters; (3) Japan will cooperate with China to
help develop the latter's electrical power potential, its coal mines and
its nonferrous metal industries; (4) a treaty on science and
technological exchange will be entered into by the two nations; (5)
Japanese businesses will be permitted to open offices in China in order
to facilitate their trading activities; and (6) the PRC tentatively ac-
90 Henderson & Matsuo, Trade with Japan, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S
FOREIGN TRADE 54 (V. Li ed. 1977).
91 Shaney, supra note 87, at 654.
92 Heuser, supra note 84, at 165.
91 United States-Japan Trade Council Report, September 25, 1978, at 1.
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cepted the Japanese request that interest rates for the financing of its
import program be calculated according to OECD guidelines.9 4
The September amendments to the LTTA moved away from
quantifying the course of the bilateral trade to concentrating more on
long-range development assistance, with the Japanese acting as con-
sultants and advisers. Some of the points initially raised in February
also were clarified further. Instead of a general statement of intent
supporting technological interchange, the two countries were ready, in
September, to sign a formal treaty on technology transfer. Further-
more, the application of the OECD's criteria on interest rates replaced
the ambiguities in article 3 of the February accord.
D. Political Implications of the LTTA
While the present Chinese enthusiasm for stimulating trade with
Japan is transparent and unabated, the PRC has not been completely
oblivious to the benefits of putting political pressure on Japan. As a
bargaining tool, the Chinese always can play on Japanese anxiety and
suspicions about Russian motives and aspirations in Asia. Tokyo's
traditional mistrust of the Soviet Union has been accentuated in 1978
by the latter's intransigence over the "Northern Islands" problem. Ir-
redentist emotions in Japan run very high over these four islands in the
Kurils (a chain of islands extending between Hokkaido in Japan and
the Kamchatka peninsula 'in Siberia), which the Japanese claim have
been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union since the end of World
War II. On the other hand, one must not forget the extent of Japanese
financial participation in several massive Siberian projects, such as the
construction of the Vrangel port facilities, the exploration for coal and
natural gas in the Yakutsk region, and the exploitation of the abun-
dant timber resources. 9
Chinese political coercion was effectively at work in connection
with the abortive attempt by the Soviets to secure Japanese cooperation
and investment for the development of the Tyumen oil fields in
Western Siberia. Initially, the Russians offered forty million tons of oil
annually to the Japanese (later reduced to twenty-five million tons a
94 For a general review of the terms of the September extension, see id. at 1-2.
Also see U.S.-CHINA Bus. REV., September-October 1978, at 70. Further discussion of
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-an interna-
tional group consisting of 24 of the world's industrial nations including Japan) and its
guidelines will be found at pp. 328-31 infra.
9s FAR EAST. EcON. REV., August 18, 1978, at 45-46.
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year) in exchange for financial assistance estimated in the billions of
dollars.96 In comparison, the Chinese proposals on oil exports would
not entail such substantial Japanese financial exposure, although the
fifteen million ton figure set in the LTTA for 1982 was far short of
twenty-five million tons. When the Soviets decided to build a second
Siberian railroad for transporting Tyumen oil to their Pacific northeast
region, vigorous Chinese protests over Japanese involvement was a per-
suasive factor in leading the Japanese to opt out of the Tyumen pro-
ject. According to Peking, this new rail line could only improve
Moscow's military transport capabilities to reinforce its troops facing
China along the two nations' common border.
Political leverage also entered into Japanese calculations concerning
the value of entering into LTTA. A major economic alliance with
their largest Asian neighbor would act as a countervailing force against
the uncertainty and recent tensions in Japanese relations with the
United States and Western Europe. Growing resentment over Japanese
economic penetration had precipitated a new wave of protectionism.
For many Japanese businessmen, the panacea for their mounting
economic woes was naturally a large volume of trade with the
Mainland. Clearly Keidanren, as the principal voice for the large
Japanese trading concerns, was instrumental in getting the LTTA sign-
ed.Its powers of persuasion were especially impressive considering that
the Japanese petroleum and electrical power industries were very ner-
vous about the quality and quantity of the PRC's oil products. In con-
trast to this apprehensive attitude for the "leaders of the' largest
Japanese manufacturing firms, however, the combination of what they
believed to be a vast and dependable export market and a source of
energy supply potential as vast-if somewhat less dependable-was ir-
resistible. 97
VI. SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY
A. Tentative Steps
With the establishment of close commercial relations, the next
logical move was the drafting of a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship
Treaty (Friendship Treaty) to cement political ties. One of the
rationales suggested for Chinese interest in such a bond was the Maoist
" Id. at 46. Also see Clough,' The International Impact of China's Foreign
Trade, in POST-MAO CHINA AND U.S.-CHINA TRADE 147-48 (S. Leng ed. 1977).
"1 Fukui, Japan and China: Peace at Last, 75 CURRENT HIST. 149, 152 (1978).
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doctrine of the "Three Worlds." Making up the "first world" were the
"imperialist" United States and the "social imperialist" Soviet Union,
both of whom were the "common enemies of the people of the world."
In the "second world" were Europe, Canada and Japan-the rest of
the industrialized nations-while China was a proud member of the
"third world," consisting of the developing nations in Africa, Asia and
Latin America.98 For the third world countries, the primary aim was
to struggle against the tyranny and oppression respresented by the first
world. But since the second world also is subjugated to the first world,
"in its struggle against hegemonism, the third world should wherever
possible win second world countries to the common revolutionary
cause.
'99
"Hegemonism" has become synonymous with Russian aggression, in
the Chinese view, ever since the 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia. °0 0 Menaced by the Russian bear in the north and its
client-states like Vietnam in the south, the PRC's obsessive preoccupa-
tion with hegemony is somewhat understandable, especially in light of
its rather parlous state of military preparedness. When Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs Han Nien-lung visited Tokyo in November 1974, he
stressed the need for an anti-hegemony clause in a Friendship Treaty.
The Tanaka-Chou Communiqu6 on normalization contained such
language; thus, so should the treaty, as a natural outgrowth of the
communiqut. i°i To the Chinese, the ratification of a Friendship Treaty
would be a symbolic culmination of events following normalization,
and also would signal the cessation of the technical state of war which
had existed since the inception of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937.
Japanese response to the PRC's overtures was one of hesitation, at-
tributable to both domestic opposition within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and harsh warnings by the Soviet press over
the dire consequences of such an agreement.
Adding to the internal political disarray was the forced resignation
of Kakei Tanaka in the aftermath of the Lockheed scandal, and his
replacement by Takeo Miki, who had to act gingerly in the foreign
policy area while trying to consolidate his domestic position. By May of
1975, however, Miki had indicated to Peking his willingness to proceed
with treaty negotiations. In late September of that same year, foreign
's Clubb, China and the Three Worlds, 75 CURRENT HIST. 53 (1978).
I d.
"' Fukui, supra note 97, at 151.
101 Halpem, supra note 64, at 116.
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minister Kiichi Miyazawa conferred with the PRC's foreign minister,
Chiao Kuan-hua in New York City, while both men were attending the
United Nations General Assembly session. Relations soured when
Miyazawa presented the Chinese minister with his four points or condi-
tions regarding the inclusion of an anti-hegemony provision in the
treaty. Under Miyazawa's view, the clause would only be palatable if it
were made clear that the language was not specifically directed against
a third country, i.e., the Soviet Union, if it would not necessitate joint
Sino-Japanese action, if it would be applicable beyond the Asian
region, and if it was in conformity with the spirit of the United Na-
tions Charter. 0 2 Of course, the PRC reaction to Miyazawa's qualifica-
tions was predictably negative, and talks were suspended.
Shortly after Takeo Fukuda took office in early 1977 he tried to
end the stalemate by asking Yoshikatsu Takeiri, the chairman of the
Komei Party, to convey a message to Hua Kuo-feng expressing his
desire to reactivate treaty negotiations. 08 Moreover, Fukuda's cabinet
secretary and later foreign minister, Sunao Sonoda, observed that the
new government did not feel morally bound by Miyazawa's four
points. 0 4 Fukuda spent the rest of 1977 endeavoring to piece together
a coalition within the dissension-torn ranks of the LDP in support of
the rapprochement with China. Of particular concern to him were
those unruly factions within the LDP strongly loyal to Taiwan.
By the beginning of 1978, Fukuda's determination to conclude a
treaty had taken on a new urgency because of two factors. First of all,
the Japanese decided to separate developments in Sino-Japanese rela-
tions from the unsatisfactory progress being made in normalizing ties
between Moscow and Tokyo. Moscow's suggested draft of a Good
Neighborhood and Cooperation Pact with Japan had stunned an in-
credulous Tokyo by demanding the virtual renunciations of the United
States-Japan security arrangement and the shelving of the Kuril Islands
question. Secondly, Fukuda was under severe domestic pressure to do
something dramatic and flamboyant to revive his sagging popularity,
which had been affected by the opening of Narita airport and a
worsening business slump. 0 5 Encouragement also was emanating from
Peking: Zbigniew Brzezinski, in briefing Fukuda on his talks with the
PRC in May of 1978 indicated that Peking wanted a resumption of
102 Id. at 119.
103 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., February 4, 1977, at 8-9.
104 Id. at 8.
"os ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, March 1978, at 3.
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treaty negotiations. It was also Brzezinski's impression that the dispute
over the Tiao Yu-t'ai Islands (referred to by the Japanese as the
Senkaku Islands) would not be an obstacle to the successful conclusion
of a Friendship Treaty. 0 6
B. The Tiao Yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islands Controversy: Legal and
Political Ramifications
1. Impact on Sino-Japanese Relations in 1978
The dormant contest over control of the Tiao Yu-t'ai (Senkaku)
Islands' had suddenly erupted again on April 12, 1978. A fleet of
137 Chinese fishing boats intruded into what was considered by Tokyo
as Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. A series of
such trespassing incidents continued for several days before the Chinese
voluntarily withdrew. Within the LDP, the anti-treaty groups unleash-
ed a storm of protest. Over thirty of these conservative LDP members
were visiting Taiwan around the times of the Senkaku imbroglio. 08
The Chinese leadership initially appeared as befuddled and nonplussed
by the Tiao Yu-t'ai incursions as the Japanese. However, through Vice
Premier Keng Piao, the PRC quickly assured Tokyo that the incidents
were "accidental" and "unplanned," resulting from overzealous
fishermen in "hot pursuit" of fish. 0 9 Some China watchers speculated
that the crisis was deliberately fomented by local elements in the PRC's
eastern maritime provinces still faithful to the Gang of Four." 0 More
plausibly, Peking may have felt that this show of strength, combined
with a willingness to put aside the Tiao Yu-t'ai territorial question,
would be favorably compared by the Japanese to Russian obstinancy
over the Kuril Islands issue.
From the Japanese point of view, Tokyo and Peking were said to
have reached a "tacit understanding" at the time of normalization that
"neither country will touch on" the problem of the Senkaku Islands."'
Semantically this phrase had a different political shading from "shelv-
ing" the issue. "Shelving" the dispute recognized its negative effect on
106 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1978, at 24, col. 3.
107 These islands are eight small islets and rocks 120 nautical miles northeast of
Taiwan and approximately 200 nautical miles west of Okinawa, the most well-known
island in the Ryukyus.
108 FAR EAST. EcON. REv., May 12, 1978, at 25.
109 Id., April 28, 1978, at 10.
110 Id. at 12.
M' Asahi Shimbun, April 16, 1978, at 2.
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the whole process of normalization, while "neither country will touch
on" implied that both sides had for the indeterminate future agreed to
ignore the question entirely without acknowledging it as an impedi-
ment to normalization." 2 Chinese consent to this approach of not
"touching on" Tiao Yu-t'ai was illustrated when Teng Hsiao-ping signed
the Friendship Treaty in Japan. He reiterated that the question of the
Senkaku Islands should be left to the next generation to work out."
Besides brushing aside the Tiao Yu-t'ai controversy, the PRC also
chose not to use the approval by the Japanese Diet in June 1977 of the
Japan-South Korea Agreement on the joint development of the con-
tinental shelf in the East China Sea as an excuse to jeopardize negotia-
tions on a Friendship Treaty. To be sure, Peking reacted verbally to
the Diet's ratification move, with the Foreign Ministry protesting
vehemently.
The East China Sea continental shelf is the natural extension of
the Chinese continental territory. The People's Republic of China has
inviolable sovereignty over the East China Sea continental shelf. It
stands to reason that the question of how to divide those parts of the
East China Sea continental shelf which involve other countries should
be decided by China and the countries concerned through consulta-
tions. The so-called Japan-South Korea agreement on joint develop-
ment of the continental shelf . . . is entirely illegal and null and
void .... 114
Chinese flexibility on these two interrelated issues of the Tiao
Yu-t'ai Islands and the exploration of the East China Sea continental
shelf was particularly revealing, considering the importance of these
questions from both an international law and an economic standpoint.
Under the terms of the LTTA, perhaps the pivotal factor in the PRC's
ability to pay for its ambitious importation program is optimism con-
cerning future petroleum production. Favorable estimates about
China's oil potential partially rely on the undiscovered riches in the
East China Sea region stretching from southern Kyushu in Japan to the
Tiao Yu-t'ai Islands just above Taiwan."' The Japan-South Korea
I12 Id.
'" Wash. Post, October 30, 1978, § A, at 18.
', Cohen & Park, China's Oil Policy, in POST-MAO CHINA AND U.S.-CHINA
TRADE 130-31 (S. Leng ed. 1977).
"I In 1968, a comprehensive survey of the potential in the East China Sea con-
tinental shelf area conducted by K.O. Emery for CCOP/ECAFE (the Committee for
Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas
established by the U.N. affiliated Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East)
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Agreement on joint continental shelf development was designed to
resolve conflicting claims over two clusters of obscure islands, respec-
tively named the Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima group. Many of the
legal arguments advanced by China against Japan and by Korea
against Japan are quite similar because the Danjo Gunto and Tori
Shima Islands and the Tiao Yu-t'ai Islands share the same topographical
features. Bordering these islands on their eastern sides is the Okinawa
Trough, a great cavity in the ocean floor which plays a vital role in
calculations on ownership of the continental shelf. In both instances,
there are two interlocking issues; territorial sovereignty over the islands
themselves and the legal effect given the islands in the demarcation of the
continental shelf. 1
6
2. The Continental Shelf Problem
Complicating the Tiao Yu-t'ai situation are the claims of Taiwan
which were asserted on July 17, 1969, through a declaration of
sovereignty over all natural resources in the continental shelf adjoining
Taiwan's territorial waters. In 1970, Taiwan also signed exploratory
contracts with four foreign oil companies, including Gulf and Amoco,
for the development of offshore oil deposits." 7 These moves on the
part of Taiwan were in answer to the actions taken by the Ryukyu
(Okinawa) government in 1969. At the time, the Ryukyu Islands were
still administered by the United States as a post-World War II legacy.
In early 1969, competing applications supported by Japanese interests
were made on behalf of citizens of Okinawa for mining rights in the
East China Sea around Tiao Yu-t'ai." 8 When the Ryukyu government
proposed to form its own oil company on December 4, 1970, the PRC
intervened in the controversy and staked its claim to both the East
China and Yellow Sea continental shelves." 9 In addition to offsetting
concluded that there was the "high probability ... that the continental shelf between
Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world." Quoted
in Park, Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy, in
STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW 213 (Harvard Law School, 1973).
A Norwegian oceanographer, Jan-Olaf Willums, has put the potential reserves of
the East China Sea basin between 8 and 10.5 billion tons (60 to 80 billion barrels).
Cited in S. HARRISON. CHINA, OIL AND ASIA: CONFLICT AHEAD? 43, 55, 275, 278
(1977).
116 Park, supra note 115, at 248.
n Id. at 224.
" Id. at 221-22.
119 Id. at 222, 230.
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the intrigues of the Ryukyu government, the PRC's announcement was
aimed at squashing any discussion of joint continental shelf develop-
ment among Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Not wanting to offend
the PRC, both the United States and Japan decided to freeze develop-
ment projects in the Tiao Yu-t'ai area until final disposition of the
legal issues involved. 120
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf is the chief
fount of the legal principles applicable to the Senkaku dispute. "Con-
tinental shelf' is defined in article 1 of the Geneva Convention as the
seabed and subsoil of "submarine areas adjacent to the coast [of a con-
tinent or of islands] but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas." According to article 2(1) the "coastal
state" has "over the contenental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." When there are
conflicting claims by "coastal states," reference is made to article 6(1).
[T]he boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such
States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified
by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is
measured. 121
Under article 6(1), deviation from the generally used median line
criterion is justified by "special circumstances." Amplification of this
doctrine was provided by the International Court of Justice in its
famous 1969 decision, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 122 While
observing that the division of the continental shelf should be regulated
by "equitable principles," the International Court of Justice also agreed
that delimitation should leave to "each Party all those parts of the con-
tinental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural pro-
longation of the land territory of the other."' 23
Chinese pronouncements on the East China Sea continental shelf
issue must be viewed in connection with their consistent support for
120 Id. at 233.
"2' Quoted in id. at 235.
122 Id. at 235-36.
123 [1969] I.C.J. at 53. Quoted in Park, supra note 115, at 236.
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Third World proposals to expand the jurisdiction of coastal nations
over territorial waters. 2 4 Pointing to the precedent established by
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the PRC has maintained that the
East China Sea continental shelf is a "natural prolongation" of Chinese
territory, enabling Peking to gain control over almost 600 miles of shelf
in the northern parts of the East China Sea and around 200 miles in
the southern end near Taiwan and Tiao Yu-t'ai. 21 The PRC regards
the Okinawa Trough as the logical termination line to the East China
Sea continental shelf; it thus serves as the boundary to Peking's
"natural prolongation" claims. The location of the Trough, argue the
Chinese, constitutes the "special circumstances" anticipated by the
North Sea Continental Shelf decision. On the other hand, the Trough
has no legal or geographical relevance for the Japanese, who adhere to
the more restrictive median line technique. Under the median line
principle, the Trough is simply disregarded. Instead, the Tiao Yu't'ai
Islands are used as the base points, and in drawing a line equidistant
from these islands, Japanese sovereignty would extend over a large
tract of continental shelf. 2 6 Parallel theories have been advanced by
the South Koreans and the Japanese over the role of the Danjo Gunto
and Tori Shima Islands in delimiting the continental shelf.
3. Territorial Claims
International recognition of Japanese ownership of the Senkaku
Islands would help justify the application of the median line doctrine.
However, if the islands are awarded to the PRC, 'the status of the
Okinawa Trough as the natural dividing line in the East China Sea
would be reinforced.
Four different concepts have been offered by the Chinese on behalf
of their territorial claims. Geographical contiguity is a corollary of the
"natural prolongation" argument. In support, it is contended that
because the continental shelf is part of the Chinese mainland, so are
the islands situated on the eastern end of the shelf. Next, the PRC
refers to the dictates of custom and usage-the areas around Tiao Yu-
t'ai have been traditional fishing grounds for Chinese fishermen.
Third, the islands were first discovered by the Chinese in 1403. Final-
124 PEKING REv., August 16, 1974, at 5-6.
M For a recent restatement of this position, see PEKING REV., June 30, 1978, at
25.
126 Park, supra note 115, at 242-43.
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ly, the disposition of the Tiao Yu-t'ai Islands under treaties is adduced
by Peking in support of its claim to title. Upon China's defeat in the
Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan and its adjoining islands (in-
cluding Tiao Yu-t'ai) were ceded to Japan under the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. In 1945, Tokyo agreed, under the conditions of the
Cairo Declaration, to return all territory stolen from China. This set-
tlement also encompassed the spoils of 1895.127
By itself contiguity has never been sufficient in the past to settle
territorial disputes. 121 Allegiance to customary usage arguments could
backfire on the PRC, since the April 1978 incidents demonstrated that
the Japanese have temporarily seized de facto control of the fishing
waters around the Senkaku Islands. As for the idea of possession
through discovery, Tokyo might be able to prove that true ownership
to the islands was not established by the Chinese "sightings" in the Fif-
teenth Century, but rather by the formal steps taken in Japan in 1895.
It is unclear whether Chinese actions before 1895 were tantmount to
occupation and control, 29 although there is an Imperial Edict of 1893
which purports to convey part of the islands to a private Chinese
citizen. 130
Following the end of World War II, the Senkaku Islands were in-
cluded in the Ryukyu Islands under United States trusteeship. On
December 27, 1953, a local ordinance formally placed the islands
within the purview of the Ryukyu government's administrative powers,
without the Chinese raising any objections."' Nevertheless, the
Japanese proprietary rights to the Senkaku Islands on this basis can be
rebutted by the PRC, since silence cannot be equated with consent in
matters of territorial sovereignty. 3 2 Another flawed argument put
forth by the Japanese is dependent on the terms of the United States-
Japan Reversion Treaty of May 15, 1972, permitting Tokyo to exercise
complete dominion over the Ryukyus (including the Senkaku Islands).
Conveniently ignored is the United States admonition that the Rever-
sion Treaty did not settle any underlying dispute over possession of
1' See id. at 248-54, for a general history of the Tiao Yu-t'ai Islands and China's
four arguments in support of its sovereignty over the islands.
128 Contiguity has been viewed as a supplementary means of proving possession.
See, e.g., The Island of Palmas Case, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949).
12' Li, China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao- yii-Tai Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INTL
STUD. 143, 153 (1975).
"s Park, supra note 115, at 130.
" Li, supra note 129, at 152.
132 The Island of Palmas Case, note 128 supra.
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Tiao Yu-t'ai, but was intended to act solely as an administrative
expedience. 33
4. Resolution of the Tiao Yu-t'ai Question
After analyzing the various Japanese and Chinese positions on Tiao
Yu-t'ai, one is led to conclude that there is no legal theory which une-
quivocally tips the balance one way or the other. Furthermore,
although both the PRC and Japan have invoked the law of the sea
principle laid down by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf, their reliance does not have any binding legal impact, since
neither is a signatory of the Convention. There is no assurance that
either nation will continue to respect the prescriptions of the 1958
Convention, especially if the impasse over the Senkaku Islands is not
ended soon. After all, most of the tenets of international law were the
creation of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century European powers.' In
the eyes of the Chinese, their professed solidarity with the developing
world usually requires them to reject traditional principles of the law
of the sea as the products of imperialist and colonial maritime powers.
"[T]he hegemony of superpowers trying to partition and control the
seas must be firmly opposed."'13 If the PRC regards Japan as a fellow
sufferer under the yoke of an international law system devised by an
ethnocentric Europe, its attitude toward the Tiao Yu-t'ai issue might be
more conciliatory. Peking might suggest that both sides should calmly
and independently arrive at their own solution free of the restrictions
imposed by an antiquated and unjust version of international law. But
if Japan is viewed as a new superpower seeking economic self-
aggrandizement at the expense of the PRC, Peking could prove to be
an intractable adversary.
Since the legal arguments are inconclusive, a peaceful resolution of
the Tiao Yu-t'ai problem will entail full and measured consideration of
the political and economic motivations at work. Tiao Yu-t'ai could
pose great dangers for long-range Sino-Japanese trade prospects. A
possible scenario would envision persistent Japanese assertions of
sovereignty over the islands, frustrating PRC efforts to exploit the off-
shore oil deposits. In turn, this would engender great hostility in Pe-
king and threaten the smooth functioning of the LTTA, because the
"'3 Park, supra note 115, at 255.
134 Li, supra note. 129, at 154-55.
135Id. at 155.
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PRC's reliance on oil as its main source of financing in the burgeoning
trade with Japan would be severely undermined. Pragmatists within
the Japanese leadership should point out that the Senkaku controversy
has Tokyo working at cross-purposes with its own self-interest. Let the
PRC develop the petroleum resources of the East China Sea in order to
better meet the costs of modernization as represented by the LTTA. A
compromise solution might include Japanese technical and financial
assistance under the guise of a joint venture project or a product
payback arrangement. What makes the Tiao Yu-t'ai conundrum so
vexing is the presence of a third interested party, Taiwan. How the
future of PRC-Taiwan relations will be influenced by the dispute over
Tiao Yu-t'ai can only be a matter of conjecture.
C. Provisions of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty
With the agreed upon non-discussion of the Senkaku Islands pro-
blem, the dominant remaining obstacle to the signing of a Friendship
Treaty was the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause. Unable to sway
the Chinese from their inflexible stand on hegemony, Japanese
negotiators sought at least to dilute the clause's impact. Yosuke Nakae,
the head of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, made
the anti-hegemony principles analogous to non-interference in domestic
affairs. 1" 6 Moreover, the Japanese did induce Peking to change the
phrase from "each country will oppose" efforts at establishing
hegemony to "each is opposed," in order to discourage any hint of the
possibility of joint military action being taken against hegemonism. 13
As a final concession to Japanese apprehension over irritating Moscow,
article IV was introduced, stating that the treaty "shall not effect the
position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third
countries.""18 This language was not as precise as the original Japanese
proposal, which assured that "[t]he treaty is not directed against any
specific third country,""'1 but was sufficient to mollify Tokyo.
On August 12, 1978, the historic Treaty of Peace and Friendship
was signed in Peking by Huang Hua and Sunao Sonoda, the foreign
ministers, respectively, of the PRC and Japan. The treaty was to run
for a ten year period and then continue indefinitely until terminated
upon one year's written notice by one of the signatories. In article 1(1),
136 FAR EAST. EcON. REv., August 4, 1978, at 18.
1"7 Id. at 20.
118 PEKING REv., August 18, 1978, at 8.
139 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., August 25, 1978, at 8.
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the two sides essentially embraced the PRC's "Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence" as the ideological underpinning for their friend-
ship: "Durable relations of peace and friendship between the two
countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful
coexistence." 140
Article II was the controversial anti-hegemony clause prohibiting
each nation from seeking hegemony in the "Asia-Pacific region or in
any other region," and opposing efforts by other countries to impose
hegemony. Economic ties, according to article III, were to be
developed in conformity with the "principles of equality and mutual
benefit."
Viewing the treaty as a whole, the PRC did manage to incorporate
the concept of hegemony but gradually acceded to Japanese demands
for modification, so that the end result was not far from satisfying
Miyazawa's original four points. For Peking, the critical element was
the legitimization of its anti-hegemony posture for as Teng Hsiao-ping
observed, it "is the first time that such a stipulation is included in an
international treaty."' Besides being directed against the truculency
of the Soviet Union, article II also restrained Japan and China.
Chinese comments on the Friendship Treaty admitted that China's
potential for aggression, with its abundant natural human resources,
caused other nations to worry about China's future tendencies toward
hegemonism. Disavowing hegemony was even more necessary for Japan
since "many Asian countries which suffered from Japanese militarism's
aggression fear and oppose Japan's embarking again on the militarist
road.""142 Chinese fears about the dominating nature of Japanese
economic activity were also implicitly expressed in the hegemony
language. Japan's recent military escapades were firmly in the mind of
Fukuda, who saw the treaty as a pledge that the miseries afflicting
Sino-Japanese relations in the Twentieth Century would not occur
again."1' For Tokyo, the Friendship Treaty was partial atonement for
the abuses of World War II.
140 See PEKING REv., August 18, 1978, at 7-8, for a complete text of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.
14' Id., October 27, 1978, at 4.
142 Id., October 20, 1978, at 20.
143 Id., October 27, 1978, at 4-5.
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Article III and its "principles of equality and mutual benefit"
could lead to "all possible forms of cooperation, including loans, in
agricultural and industrial production or developmental projects."' 44
One wonders if the "principles of equality and mutual benefit" can be
generously interpreted to encourage the formation of joint ventures in
developing the PRC's natural resources or its archaic industrial base.
D. Varying Interpretations of the Friendship Treaty
Immediate reaction to the treaty in official Japanese circles was
over what were considered major PRC concessions, pointing to the
newly worded hegemony clause, the non-recurrence of Senkaku Islands
incidents, and a vague promise by Peking to abrogate the Sino-Soviet
Treaty.' 4 5 One newspaper editorial cautioned that the Soviet Union
would regard the Friendship Treaty as the final link in Japan-United
States-China axis, making it incumbent on Tokyo to stress how objec-
tive its "omnidirectional peace diplomacy" actually was. 146 Other
Japanese politicians averred that an "omnidirectional" foreign policy
meant Japan could still give priority to relations with Peking over those
with Moscow as long as Tokyo was not actively antagonistic to the Rus-
sians. 4 7 A distinction was drawn between the non-resolution of the
Senkaku Islands dilemma and the Kuril Islands problem. The former
were still uninhabited while the Soviet Union had occupied the Kurils
for over thirty years. 4 8 Fueling the implicit anti-Russian gloss put on
the treaty was the deep-seated Japanese antipathy toward the Russians,
who were consistently ranked as the "most disliked" foreigners in
public opinion polls."49
Soviet anger over the treaty was concentrated more on the PRC
rather than on Japan. Tass caustically remarked that "the treaty is in.
conflict with the interests of peace and detente, it is fraught with
tremendous dangers primarily to the people of Southeast Asia, who
have already long been target of aggressive aspirations of Peking
leaders."'5 0
While the majority of the Japanese leadership remained uncomfort-
able about the unstated anti-Soviet bias of the Friendship Treaty, the
I'l Id., October 20, 1978, at 122.
141 Wash. Post, August 13, 1978, § A, at 26.
146 Asahi Evening News, August 15, 1978, at 2.
141 Id., August 18, 1978, at 5.
148 Id.
149 Christian Sci. Monitor, August 14, 1978, at 9.
110 Wash. Post, August 13, 1978, § A, at 27.
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PRC was understandably elated. For instance, Teng suggested efforts
should be made in Japan to strengthen its defensive capabilities, and
thereby contribute to the overall movement to stop the spread of Rus-
sian militarism."" To demonstrate the PRC's magnanimity, Teng also
agreed to cancel the moribund Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and
alliance, with its explicit anti-Japanese tone, through the New China
News Agency. 5 2 Japanese mortification and discomfiture over the
PRC's heavy-handed interpretation of the Friendship Treaty was great-
ly increased when General Chang Tsai-chien, deputy chief of the
General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, visited Japan soon after
the signing of the pact. He brought up the subject of military coopera-
tion between the two countries, and courted the more hawkish generals
in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. 15 3 General Chang's blatant at-
tempts to rouse the Japanese high command against the Soviet Union
even compelled such an ardent militarist as Yasahiro Nakasone of the
ruling LDP to advocate concluding a treaty with Moscow to balance
out Japan's foreign policy offensive. 1 '
The signing of the Friendship Treaty does initially appear to be a
diplomatic triumph for the PRC. At the minimal sacrifice of making
some "face-saving" compromises to placate Tokyo, Peking achieved its
primary goal of acquiring a new weapon for its arsenal against the
"cancerous" growth of Russian imperialism. For Tokyo, the treaty was
another confidence-building move designed to ensure the continued
flourishing of Sino-Japanese trade. But this intangible benefit was ac-
complished at a substantial cost-the Soviet Union's paranoia about an
Asian conspiracy directed against Moscow was intensified, and as a
result the establishment of better relations between Moscow and Tokyo
will be an arduous and excruciating task.
VII. CHINESE EXPORT ITEMS UNDER THE LTTA
A. Prospects for the PRC's Petroleum Industry
The exportation of oil has been assigned a central place in China's
modernization movement. Instead of being a commodity regarded by
the Gang of Four as too rare to sacrifice in foreign trade, oil was to be
exported as "the crowning achievement of self-reliance" which played a
"I FAR EAST. ECON. REv., September 22, 1978, at 20.
162 Id.
"'1 Christian Sci. Monitor, September 9, 1978, at 5.
154 Id.
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major role in the country's "trade for commodities necessary for the
construction of socialism."'5 5 Such a constructive use of oil resources
was vigorously highlighted at the "First National Learn from Taching
in Industry Conference," held in April and May of 1977. At this
gathering, Yu Chiu-li, chairman of the State Planning Commission,
exhorted the masses to develop ten more oil fields as large as Taching
before the end of the century. As the paragon of industrial productivi-
ty in China, Taching alone accounted for about forty-five percent of
the PRC's total petroleum output in 1976.156
One of the chief difficulties in accurately determining the PRC's oil
export capacities is the evasiveness and lack of precision in Chinese
data on their oil reserves. No official information has been released
since the Cultural Revolution. 57 When in 1973 Peking proudly pro-
claimed that its reserves were ranked third in the world, no statistical
evidence was introduced. 58 More recently a projected goal has been
set calling for a 1990 annual production of 400 million tons or three
billion barrels (the conversion rate is one ton to about 7.5 barrels),
which is approximately the current level of Saudi Arabia's output.5 9
Oil reserves have traditionally been classified as "confirmed,"
"recoverable" or "possible" deposits. Figures offered by the Chinese on
their potential reserves may not be stringently attuned to the economic
realities of the oil business. Since the PRC is not too concerned about
profit margins, reserves might be "recoverable" and thus feasible to
develop even if the costs are exorbitant.16 0
A cautious estimate by A. A. Meyerhoff in 1968 stated that China
had 2.7 billion tons of proven and potential oil reserves. 61 Later, he
suggested that the East China Sea could contain another 1.7 billion
tons.162 By 1976, Meyerhoff had adjusted his figures for China's oil
deposits to around five billion tons or thirty-nine billion barrels, which
also coincided with the conclusions reached in the CIA's June 1977
"' Morrison, supra note 9, at 701.
156 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 110.
'5' The last official survey taken in 1966 placed total Chinese reserves at seven
billion tons. Kim, supra note 58, at 605.
1' Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 109.
1"9 S. HARRISON, supra note 115, at 12, 268.
160 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 110.
161 Kim, supra note 58, at 605.
162 Meyerhoff, China's Petroleum Potential, 1975 WORLD PETROLEUM REP. 21.
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study. 6 There have been more positive predictions concerning off-
shore oil riches. Over nine billion tons were to be found in the Yellow
Sea (Pohai Gulf) region, according to one Japanese estimate, while a
Japanese government survey estimated fifteen billion tons would be
discovered just around the Tiao Yu-t'ai area. 6 4
China did not begin exporting oil to the Western industrialized
countries (including Japan) until 1973, when one million tons went
overseas, out of a total production in the neighborhood of 54.8 million
tons. From 1973 to 1977, domestic production increased steadily
(reaching ninety-two million tons in 1977), along with the amounts
committed to the export market. The 8.8 million tons exported in
1975 dropped to 7.05 million tons in 1976 because of internal political
turmoil and the Tangshan earthquake (China diverted its attention to
rebuilding the stricken coal industry). 65 At the peak in 1975, oil ex-
ports provided $910 million in revenues to a country running a $455
million deficit. Even in 1976, China was able to earn $700 million
from oil sales, contributing immensely to an overall foreign exchange
surplus of $900 million. 66 In the first three quarters of 1978 petroleum
exports continued to rise rapidly. Exports to the Philippines and Hong
Kong showed, respectively, a 75% and an 89.8% increase over the
corresponding 1977 period.16 Agreement in 1978 was reached for
Japan to import 7.1 million tons, which exceeds the goal set in the
LTTA by 100,000 tons. 'Through the first nine months, Japan had
purchased over $535 million worth of Chinese oil.168
Since the inception of the PRC's oil exportation program, Japan
has been by far the major customer. Japan has developed this trade
through two consortia of business interests, the International Oil Com-
pany, Ltd., and the Importers of Chinese Petroleum Conference. The
International Oil Company initiated the trade, since it is comprised of
'63 CHINA NEWSLETTER 15 (June 1978). In the CIA's report, China's ultimately
recoverable reserves could reach the 100 billion barrel level, taking into account every
favorable assumption. Cohen & Park, supra note 1i4, at 111.
M64 For the Yellow Sea (Pohai Gulf) figure, see Kim, supra note 58, at 605. The
Tiao Yu-t'ai estimate is in Marine Geologic Investigations of the Offshore Area Around
the Senkaku Islands, Southern Ryukyu Islands, U.N. Doc. CCOP/TAG (VI) 32 (1969).
'" CHINA NEWSLETrER 14 (June 1978). These amounts do not include exports to
Hong Kong, Singapore and Communist countries.
166 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 123.
'6' CHINA NEWSLETTER 3 (December 1978).
168 See id. at 7, for the $535 million figure; see also id. at 19 (September 1978),
for the agreed on yearly amount.
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the leading Japanese oil firms such as Idemitsu Kosan and Maruzen,
plus the basic users of Chinese crude, nine electrical power companies
and six iron and steel manufacturers.1 69 Japan was the only Western
importer of the PRC's oil in 1973, and has consistently taken up the
lion's share of the exported quantities. 70
Crude oil constituted only a 3.3% portion of Japan's total imports
from China in 1973, but rapidly rose to a 31.5% share in 1974, a stag-
gering 48.3% in 1975, slumping to 41% in 1976, then improving
slightly to 42.3% in 1977, and providing a 38% share in the first nine
months of 1978.17k It is interesting to note the slight decline in oil's
dominant position among Japan's China imports since 1975. This
could conceivably reflect the Chinese desire to diversify its exports, but
it most likely demonstrates the concern of Japanese oil interests over
the quality of Taching crude. Although Taching crude is low in sulfur
it is high in paraffin, necessitating the construction of expensive crack-
ing facilities in order to refine it for general industrial use. Additional-
ly, it has a high nitrogen content which certainly is not conducive to
Japanese air pollution control efforts. Because of its elevated "pour
point," Taching crude is liable to solidify under normal temperature
and pressure, thus requiring constant heating when transported
through pipelines. Such heating can be dangerous as the crude also
has a low "flash point," meaning that it is volatile.17 2
Moreover, Japanese importers have been discouraged by the
"heavy" quality of the Taching oil, and the difficulties encountered in
extracting the "light" oil components. So far, Taching crude has been
distilled to yield less than 30% "light oil," i.e., petrol 10%, kerosene
5.4%, gas 13.8%. 113 Left with a seventy percent residue of heavy oil,
the Japanese have concentrated on using thirty to forty percent of their
import volume from China as raw fuel for electrical power and the
iron and steel industries. 17 4 The thought of building new facilities to
169 CHINA NEWSLETrER 9-10 (January 1978). Figure 2 lists the members of the
Japanese consortia. Id. at 11. Table 1 gives the amounts accepted each year by the
two groups. Id. at 9.
110 See id. at 13-14 (June 1978), and especially Table 9 for estimates of Peking's
exports to Western nations (excluding Hong Kong, Singapore and the Communist
bloc).
"I For the 1973 to 1976 statistics, see id. at 11 (January 1978); for the 1977
figure, see id. at 11 (April 1978); for the 1979 percentage, see id. at 7 (December
1978).
172 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 124.
173 Id.
174 CHINA NEWSLETrER 12 (January 1978).
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further refine Taching crude is doubly unattractive to the Japanese oil
industry, because it is already saddled with expensive desulfurizing
equipment used in refining the sulfur-laden Middle East crude.7 s
Symptomatic of the prevailing attitude in Japanese oil circles was the
statement of Masami Ishida, chairman of the Petroleum Association of
Japan. 7 6 He believed that the amount of light oil products refined
from Taching crude could only be increased to forty percent, even
using the most advanced super-cracking techniques. There was also no
guarantee that the PRC would continue to satisfy its obligations under
the LTTA by supplying solely Taching oil. Furthermore, China's
petroleum was overpriced and not commensurate with its low demand.III
In contrast to this negativism among Japanese refiners were the op-
timistic calculations of Japanese manufacturers. They argued that the
specter of another Middle East oil boycott made it advisable for Japan
to seek alternative sources of supply. China was the logical substitute
with substantially lower transportation costs serving as an added bonus.
Even if the PRC no longer exported large quantities of Taching crude,
the new super-cracking plants would not go to waste; there is a
worldwide trend toward the increased consumption of heavy, "low-
gravity" crude oils.' 7 8 Bowing to such reasons, Tokyo decided to con-
struct super-crack facilities at a cost of around $350 billion per year in
a joint government-industry arrangement. ' 9 When completed in 1980,
these new plants will have a refining capacity of twenty-six million tons
of oil." Speculation has grown that the PRC might be asked to lower
the base price of Taching crude in light of this new financial burden
imposed on Japanese oil importers.
Despite grumblings about the quality of Taching crude, some
Japanese remain confident about the future of Chinese oil production.
One perhaps overly-generous projection sees China earning twelve
billion dollars in oil revenues in 1988 and producing at least 450
115 Id. at 13.
176 Nikkan Kogyo, March 7, 1978, at 1.
17 Compared to the high priced popular Inidonesian (Munas) crude, Taching
crude was almost 50 cents lower per barrel in 1975 and 1976, but by 1978, the dif-
ference was only 30 cents a barrel. See CHINA NEWSLETTER 13 (January 1978), for
1975 and 1976 prices, and Fukui, supra note 97, at 152, for the 1978 figure.
118 Fukui, supra note 97, at 152-53.
I'S Id. at 153.
SO Another estimate has suggested that Japan will eventually need 20 such
facilities for processing 40 million tons of Chinese crude at'a cost of two trillion yen
($10.5, billion). FAR EAST. ECON. Rxv., October 6, 1978, at 60.
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million tons in 1990, but this estimate is based on five conditions: (1)
availability of reserves; (2) the use of enormous capital outlays; (3)
overcoming problems in oilfield construction; (4) importing the most
sophisticated kind of oil drilling equipment; and (5) improvements in
-related facilities such as the transportation system.' 8' A more sober
judgment has Chinese oil production between 200 to 300 million tons
in 1985, allowing for exports to hit the thirty-to-fifty million ton level,
worth between $2.7 to $4.5 billion in foreign exchange. 82
According to the recent CIA forecast, the greatest risk posed to the
future of Chinese oil production is the rapid depletion of the country's
main sources of oil. By 1997, the fields in north and northeast China,
which presently furnish eighty percent of the PRC's total output, will
be dry if the production rate keeps growing ten percent each year.8 ,
To combat this pessimistic appraisal Peking not only has to find more
reserves but must continue to meet the demands of domestic consump-
tion. Domestic use of energy will clearly rise in response to the Four
Modernizations program. More oil will be needed for all of the new in-
dustrial plants that China is planning to build. Another integral facet
of the modernization plan is the mechanization of farming tasks, which
also. will consume large amounts of oil. Perhaps the most unpredictable
element will be the degree of individual consumer demand as the stan-
dard of living is boosted by this drive for material progress. Inherent in
the PRC's modernization scheme is a dangerous circularity- more oil
has to be exported in order to pay for imported technology, which, in
turn, requires fuel earmarked for export to be reallocated for domestic
industrial use.
Based on a production rate increase of ten percent per year, com-
bined with domestic demand expanding at an annual rate of fifteen
percent, the PRC's domestic requirements for oil in 1985 will exceed
the production level by about 1.5 million tons. 8 4 A more sanguine
projection of the PRC's ability to meet both internal needs and export
targets has assumed an eleven percent annual increase in oil produc-
tion between 1977 and 1985, with domestic demand growing ten per-
cent per annum and exports at fifteen percent a year.8 8 On this basis
China will produce 230 million tons in 1985, adequate to cover the
'8' Kim, supra note 58, at 606.
18, Chou, supra note 5, at 78, 89.
13 CHINA NEWSLETTER 15 (June 1978).
18 Id. at 14.
31 Chou, supra note 5, at 90.
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thirty million tons committed to export markets and the 200 million
tons devoted to domestic consumption. Cohen and Park have
estimated that oil production will be 145 million tons in 1980 with
twenty-five million tons available for export only if oil is used to meet
no more than twenty-five percent of China's total internal energy re-
quirements. 8 6 In order for the PRC to limit domestic use of
petroleum, coal production must be stepped up, as it is still the only
meaningful alternative energy source. Hydroelectric power satisfies only
a miniscule. percentage of China's energy needs, and other less conven-
tional sources such as solar energy, geothermal and nuclear power are
only in the research and development phase. 18
Aware of the pressures on the country's oil production capabilities,
Peking covets the offshore deposits in the Yellow Sea (Pohai Gulf) area
200 miles east of the capital, since the Tiao Yu-t'ai region is currently
off limits. Indicative of these aspirations was the Chinese devoting $500
million in the first half of 1978 to offshore drilling and rigging equip-
ment."'8 Of the $500 million, about one-half of the amount went to
American companies, while Hitachi gained a huge order for two of the
world's largest jack-up type drilling rigs.18 9 Given the exigencies of the
situation, China's quest for technical assistance in offshore develop-
ment probably will include joint venture agreements.
This sort of arrangement was tentatively offered to the Japan
National Oil Corporation, which was formed in July of 1978, for the
purpose of stockpiling domestic petroleum supplies and backing private
firms in their exploration activities. 90 Japan National Oil Corporation
was to participate in joint development of the Pohai Gulf area as a
separate entity and not merely as the representative of private in-
terests.' 9 ' Of course, in China's rush for technical assistance in offshore
drilling the Japanese will face tough competition from the United
States. In 1978, Peking invited delegations from four large American
186 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 120.
187 See V. SMIL, CHINA'S ENERGEY: ACHIEVEMENTS. PROBLEMS, PROSPEcTS 67-117
(1976), for a thorough discussion of the PRC's hydroelectric capacity and developments
in the unconventional energy source area.
188 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., September 1, 1978, at 97.
"9 CHINA NEWSLETTER 18 (September 1978).
190 EcONOMIST, September 2, 1978, at 90.
191 When Toshio Komoto, Japan's Minister of International Trade and Industry,
visited China in September of 1978, it was proposed even then by Peking that Japan
National Oil Corporation could jointly aid in the development of oil reserves in the
Sinkiang region. CHINA NEWSLETTER 21 (December 1978).
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companies- Pennzoil, Exxon, Union Oil and Phillips Petroleum-to
discuss proposals on offshore development. American spokesmen have
claimed a possible investment of twenty-five to fifty billion dollars by
United States oil interests in China, within the framework of a profit-
sharing plan. 192 The Japanese would have mixed feelings about a
massive influx of Western financial and technical support in the
development of China's oil reserves. On the one hand, as more oil is
discovered, it would become easier for Peking to meet the export goals
of the LTTA, but China, on the other hand, could be obligated to
divert substantial amounts of oil away from Japan to her other
Western partners.
Hampering the implementation of the PRC's oil export plans are
the transportation bottlenecks endemic to the major oil fields. China is
currently plagued by extra long pipelines, insufficient storage facilities,
a poor railroad network and ports which until recently could not ac-
commodate large oil tankers. One of the motivations behind the
development of the Pohai deposits is the hope that an offshore
transportation system will be easier to sustain, since the crude oil could
be directly loaded onto ships at the offshore site, thus obviating the
problem of congested ports. s93 By July of 1976, the port situation was
somewhat rectified by the construction at Talien of a berth capable of
receiving large oil tankers in the 50,000 to 100,000 ton range. 94 In ad-
dition, a new pipeline was constructed connecting Talien with the
Taching oil compex and a further pipeline link went from Taching to
the Peking refinery. 95
Although oil clearly is the key item in the PRC's export trade to
Japan, its importance for Japan must be viewed in proper perspective.
Even if China would sell forty million tons to Japan in 1980 (far
beyond the target set in the LTTA), this would make up only fifteen
percent of Japan's total needs. 9 6 Probably the most significant long-
term effect will be to make the PRC more reliant on Western technical
cooperation and financial assistance.
B. Ordinary and Coking Coal
Coal is the PRC's primary source of energy, and has been relied
upon in the past to provide up to ninety percent of the nation's energy
'92 Wash. Post, August 11, 1978, § A, at 1.
191 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., October 6, 1978, at 60.
194 CHINA NEWSLETrER 14 (January 1978).
1'" Chen, supra note 7, at 43.
"' Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 128.
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needs. To alleviate this pressure on the dwindling supplies of coal, at-
tention was directed towards development of the petroleum industry so
that by 1974 coal provided sixty-six percent of the country's energy
consumption. 97 Because of the calamitous Tangshan earthquake in
1976, which devastated China's largest mine located at Kailuan, efforts
were made to find new coal sources. One such source was discovered in
Anhwei Province. 19 Seeking to modernize and expand their coal
facilities in order to meet the goal established in the Ten Year Plan of
doubling coal production by 1985, the Chinese have welcomed
Japanese cooperation on a vast scale. 99
Beginning in 1974, Japan started importing either the Zhunpei or
Tatung variety of ordinary Chinese coal, used chiefly to fuel electrical
power plants. From 1974 through 1976, Japan imported a total of
335,000 tons, averaging about 100,000 tons a year. Unfortunately, the
quality of PRC coal was somewhat mixed: Zhunpei coal has a low
sulfur content but also low caloric value, while Tatung coal is
characterized by questionable burning properties.200 In addition, the
Japanese were not happy about the coal's relatively high price tag.
An overriding restraint on the present Japanese capacity to import
ordinary coal is a lack of domestic demand. In order to accommodate
the progressively increasing pace of ordinary coal purchases from
China in the later years of the LTTA, Japan will have to improve and
expand its cargo handling facilities for foreign coal haulers, since it
had always been assumed that the domestic supply of coal would be
sufficient, to cover the nation's requirements. 20' This situation will be
drastically changed if a new giant electrical power station is completed
by 1982 at Matsushima, requiring 2.4 million tons of coal yearly, with
the Chinese slated to provide one million tons of this volume. 20 2
Although Japan imported as much as 920,000 tons in 1967, by
'9' V. SMIL, supra note 187, at 145.
198 Cohen & Park, supra note 114, at 118.
199 The first offer of assistance came from an instrumentality of the Japanese
government, the International Cooperation Agency, which was willing to bear the
monetary costs of exploring for new mines. Asahi Evening News, August 15, 1978. As
of December 1978, negotiations were still continuing, but now it seems that the Japan
Coal Association is the principal Japanese party in the proposed joint venture. CHINA
NEWSLETTER 21 (December 1978). In addition, since the signing of the LTTA, the
Japanese have agreed to provide the PRC with a full range of coal-related equipment
and plant facilities. Id. at 18-20.
:00 CHINA NEWSLETTER 17 (January 1978).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 14.
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1969 it had stopped importing any Chinese coking coal, which had
previously been consumed by iron and steel mills. Among the causes
for this cessation in trade were worries about the coal's quality, i.e.,
the Kailuan variety, and a great slowdown in domestic demand. 203
Conscious of Japanese complaints about Kailuan coal, the Chinese
agreed in the first year of the LTTA to divide their 300,000 ton shipment
of ordinary coal between Kailuan and a mine in Shantung Prov-
ince. On the issue of price, the PRC bargained for a forty-nine dollars
per ton figure, but finally agreed to forty-five dollars per ton, which
was still higher than the price charged for comparative Australian and
Canadian types of coking coal. 20 4 Considering the rather weak
domestic demand, it is somewhat unclear how Japan will be able to
absorb the quite substantial amounts of coking coal targeted for the
1980 to 1982 segment of the LTTA.
VIII. SINO-JAPANESE TRADE OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF THE LTTA
A. Chinese Exports in the "Ordinary Trade"
While the Chinese exports under the LTTA have attracted the
most comment, the volume of ordinary trade (OT) exports to Japan
outside the parameters of the LTTA is and will continue to be im-
pressive. Chinese textile exports alone constituted around forty percent
of total exports to Japan in 1972 and 1973, close to twenty percent in
1976 and 1977, and over twenty-five percent in the first three quarters
of 1978.205 Meanwhile, the agricultural sector and the fishing industry
accounted for over forty percent of net Japanese exports in 1972, more
than thirty percent in 1973, and around twenty percent in 1977 and
through the first nine months of 1978. Predominent items were
seafood, vegetables such as chestnuts and soybeans, and grain,
primarily rice. 207
208 Id. at 17, 18.
204 Id. at 20 (September 1978).
205 See id. at 10 (January 1976), for a listing of the principal export and import
commodities in Sino-Japanese trade during 1972 through 1974; see also id. at 15 (April
1978), for similar statistics in 1976 and 1977; see also id. at 11 (December 1978), for
the 1978 figures.
206 Id.
207 Especially remarkable is the PRC's newly gained position as the world's
greatest rice exporter. From 1973 to 1975 alone, the volume was more than three
million tons a year, providing an average of $900 million annually. Chou, supra note
5, at 68.
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Even though the percentage of China's exports devoted to the OT
area will decrease over time, the OT exports will always be a stable
aspect of Sino-Japanese trade. Most of these commodities enjoy an en-
trenched position in Japanese markets, because they consist, for the
most part, of products for daily use.20 8 Based on an expansion in
volume of between five and ten percent per year, OT goods will ac-
count for close to one billion dollars of the projected $1.6 billion worth
of China's exports to Japan in 1978. Because of the increasing impact
of the LTTA, the OT amount will approach $1.1 to $1.4 billion in
1982, still about one-third of the total exports, estimated at $2.7 to
three billion dollars.20 9
A dark cloud hanging over the textile industry in China is the
growing trend toward protectionism in its key markets-Japan, the
United States and the European Economic Community nations. In-
creased sales to Communist and developing nations is not a terribly ap-
pealing option, since their ability to pay for these products in hard
currency is restricted. Raw silk had always been the pillar of China's
textile trade with Japan, at its heights in 1973 securing nearly a twenty
percent share of the total exports to Japan. 210 But during the 1974 to
1975 period, sales of raw silk took an abysmal plunge, falling almost
ninety percent at one point. Subjected to domestic pressure, the
Japanese had passed new legislation drastically reducing the amount of
silk to be imported.2". However, the raw silk trade rebounded,
dramatically assisted by the signing of a Japan-China agreement on silk
imports in 1977. As a trade off for Chinese reductions in the sale of
manufactured silk items to an already saturated Japanese market, the
Japanese accepted larger compensating quantities.of raw silk. 212 Japan's
erratic reactions towards Chinese raw silk imports illustrate in a nut-
shell how textile trade is so delicately impinged upon by internal
political considerations.
B. Japanese Exports Using the OT Route
Among the various Japanese OT export commodities, the perennial
leader has been metal products with iron and steel preminent. Certain
208 CHINA NEWSLETTER 21 (June 1978). For instance, in 1976, when China's total
exports to Japan fell off 10.5% as compared to 1975, China's exports in OT categories
.improved 2.6% over the previous year. Id.
209 Id. at 21 (June 1978).
210 Id. at 11 (January 1976).
211 Id.
112 Id. at 12 (April 1978).
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steel products regarded as construction material (bars, pipes and
tubes) are included in LTTA trade figures, but the great bulk of items
employed in manufacturing, such as steel plates, are considered OT
exports. 21 3
From 1968 through the early 1970's Japan exported about one
million tons of iron and steel each year to the Mainland, making the
PRC Japan's second best customer after the United States.21 By the
mid-1970's a stagnant domestic iron and steel industry forced Peking
to import more than three million tons annually. 215 Japanese predic-
tions were that the PRC could possibly overtake the United States as
Tokyo's main purchaser in 1978, buying more than 4.5 million tons. 216
With iron and steel products leading the way, the metals industry in
Japan since 1976 has held on to slightly more than a fifty percent share
of all exports to China. 217 Considering the frenetic tempo of China's
industrialization movement, this percentage should remain firm for
quite some time until China's own iron and steel facilities are
renovated and -expanded.
The other major area in Japan's OT exports has been chemicals, in
particular fertilizer, to meet China's immense agricultural demands. 218
Large quantities of fertilizers were shipped to the Mainland in the early
1970's, with the PRC becoming the world's greatest importer of
nitrogen fertilizer in 1972 (Japan providing seventy-nine percent of this
amount). 219 Since that time the quantity has steadily fallen, with
orders being placed for about two million tons in 1978.220 Sales have
not returned to early 1970 levels because of increased domestic con-
sumption in Japan and Chinese preoccupation with the more
glamorous high technology items of Japanese exports. Furthermore, it
is possible that the construction of fertilizer plants, especially during
the 1972 to 1974 period, enabled the Chinese to reduce their'
21s Extrapolating from an assumed annual growth rate of 10% to 15%, these
OT products will provide Japan with $1.5 to $1.6 billion of its total $1.9 to $2.0
billion worth of exports in 1978, and will maintain their dominance in 1982 with a
60% and more share of all exports ($2.0 to $2.5 billion out of $3.4 to $3.9 billion). Id.
at 20 (June 1978).
2,4 Kim, supra note 58, at 608.
211 Chou, supra note 5, at 67.
216 CHINA NEWSLETTrR 6 (December 1978).
211 Id. at 15 (April 1978), reveals the figures for 1976 and 1977; see id. at 11
(December 1978), for the 1978 statistics.
218 The other major components of the chemical trade have been plastics, ar-
tificial resins and organic chemicals.
' Kim, supra note 58, at 612.
220 CHINA NEWSLETTER 5 (September 1978).
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dependency on foreign sources of supply. 221 After a three year hiatus,
the PRC in 1977 again became interested in building new facilities,
with a Chinese delegation visiting several European companies
specializing in fertilizer plant construction.2 2 2 Since late 1977 two
Japanese firms have been negotiating with Peking on supplying the
equipment and technical assistance for a new fertilizer plant project. 223
Viewed statistically, the whole chemical sector has declined in im-
portance through the 1970's. Chemicals represented a 32.6% share of
total Japanese exports to China in 1972, and by the first half of 1978,
this share had fallen to 14.5%.224 What the Japanese have done is to
switch from the export of individual chemical substances and agents to
supplying petrochemical facilities which will provide China with a wide
variety of chemical products.
IX. JAPAN'S EXPORT OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS AND CONSTRUCTION
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT UNDER THE LTTA
Since normalization, Japan has consistently been the main supplier
of industrial plants to the PRC. From 1972 through 1977, the Japanese
received about one billion dollars, or one third of China's total invest-
ment in this area. 22 5 In the 1972 to 1976 period, the bulk of Japan's
plant exports were primarily in the petrochemical sector, then in iron
and steel, followed by electrical power plants, with petroleum facilities
playing quite a minor role. 226 Throughout the 1970's, China's volume
of plant importation and purchases of machinery and equipment mir-
rored very closely the fluctuations in its general trading patterns. 227
221 Heymann, supra note 71, at 29.
222 Yeh, supra note 20, at 11.
223 CHINA NEWSLETTER 20 (December 1978).
224 Id. at 10 (January 1976), for the 1972 percentage, and id. at 35 (September
1978), for the 1978 figure.
225 See id. at 6 (September 1978), where Table III breaks down the PRC's pur-
chases country-by-country for the years 1972 through 1977. Japan sold $1.017 billion
to the Mainland, out of a total of $3.148 billion, with France and Switzerland combined
in second place ($670.6 million) followed by West Germany, and the United States was
a poor fourth with only $290.8 million in sales.
126 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., August 19, 1977, at 39.
127 Japan's total exports of plant facilities and machinery and equipment hit a
peak in 1975, with over $697 million worth purchased by Peking (over 30% of Japan's
total exports to China). See CHINA NEWSLETTER 16 (September 1978), for a yearly
survey of such Japanese exports to the PRC from 1973 through the first half of 1978.
After a sharp decline in 1976 and 1977, in the first nine months of 1978 the amount
rose to $395.3 million, a 197% increase over the corresponding 1977 period, and
about a' 20% share of Japan's total exports to the Mainland. Id. at 6 (December 1978).
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Upon conclusion of the LTTA, Japanese involvement in plant im-
portation intensified. One Japanese estimate predicts that if all the pro-
posed plant contracts are signed, the total value will be in the thirty
to forty billion dollar range." 8 Already in the first nine months of
1978, firm contractual commitments for Japanese plant exports to the
PRC had reached the $486 million level, with many deals still in the
negotiation stage.22 9
By far the most substantial agreement to be formally concluded in
1978 was Nippon Steel's plan to help construct an enormous new steel
mill at Paoshan near Shanghai for a cost of $2.03 billion.2 30 This giant
complex will produce six million tons of steel annually, and is of par-
ticular interest to China, because it will be its first steel mill located
near the sea, thereby easing transportation costs. 23 ' Other large
Japanese steelmakers are still negotiating over their role in Chinese
schemes to build even larger steel facilities at Chitung in Hopei Prov-
ince (projected capacity of ten million tons a year) and at Anshan in
Liaoning Province (projected capacity of fifteen millon tons a year). 232
In addition, Japanese firms will probably assist in the renovation and
expansion of existing Chinese steel mills in Peking, Wuhan, and
Liaoning Province. All this activity is motivated by the PRC's goal
under the new Ten Year Plan to raise steel production from its present
twenty-five million tons to fifty million tons by 1985.
One of the earliest deals to be concluded under terms of the
LTTA was Kararay Company's commitment to construct a plant for
the manufacture of synthetic leather, valued at around twenty-four
million dollars. Later in the Summer of 1978 a package of plant con-
tracts was signed covering the vital components of color television sets,
a cathode ray tube facility to be completed by Hitachi and Toshiba, a
glass plant to be provided by Asahi Glass, and an integrated circuit
factory to be built by Toshiba. In conjunction with these contracts a
group led by Matsushita Electric will construct two color television
assembly plants. 233 The PRC is obviously interested in entering the
highly competitive field of consumer related electronic products, current-
ly dominated by its Asian neighbors (Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong).
228 Asahi Evening News, August 17, 1978, at 5.
22 CHINA NEWSLET-rER 7, 18-20 (December 1978). For more detailed discussion
of particular projects, see id. 11-19 (September 1978).
230 N.Y. Times, October 6, 1978, § A, at 1; id., October 6, 1978, § D, at 16.
231 CHINA NEWSLEirER 11 (September 1978).
22 N.Y. Times, October 6, 1978, § C, at 16.
233 CHINA NEWSLETTER 20 (December 1978).
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But the activity in the color television area should not be strictly
construed as a vehicle for China's export trade-it might also be a
signal that China is anxious to begin providing a limited number of
luxury items for domestic markets.
In the petrochemical area, two significant ethylene plant
agreements were signed in 1978. At Taching, for a cost approximating
twenty-five billion yen, Marubeni Corporation and Japan Gasoline
Company agreed to provide both the facilities and the technology. The
other plant, to be located at Chilin, will see the Chinese in charge of
design with the Japanese group, headed by Mitsubishi Corporation,
furnishing the equipment and technology. A noteworthy feature of the
Chilin project was that for the first time, the PRC had accepted a
Japanese trading company, Mitsubishi, as a formal contracting
party.114 Such a concession indicated an increased Chinese apprecia-
tion of the unique position in Japanese economic life held by the
Japanese trading conglomerates.
Negotiations are being conducted with Toyobo and Kanebo for the
construction of twin plants designed to manufacture polyester. When
completed, the output of these plants could equal Japan's total present
production.23 6 This astonishing possibility also demonstrates the long-
range challenge that China's developing textile industry poses to the
Japanese enterprises which are currently helping to modernize its ob-
solescent facilities. These Japanese firms are caught in a cruel dilem-
ma- the opportunities in China for large, quick profits are very seduc-
tive, but once Chinese technology is improved, the PRC's finished pro-
ducts could undercut Japan's already faltering textile industry,
especially in light of the low labor costs on the Mainland.
Acutely aware of its increased power needs for industrialization,
China has concentrated on expanding its energy potential. Besides
heavy involvement in coal development projects, the Japanese have
been asked to provide technical assistance in the construction of
nuclear power facilities and in the analysis of the gas distribution
systems in urban centers such as Peking and Shanghai. 2 6 Japanese ad-
vice also has been solicited for the revamping of the PRC's fallible
electrical power network, especially regarding its lack of an adequate
long-distance transmission system . 2 37 Faced with the idea of themselves
:34 Id. at 12 (September 1978).
tAB Id. at 19 (December 1978).
216 Id. at 21.
237 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., July 7, 1978, at 36.
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building super-cracking plants to refine China's Taching crude, the
Japanese have sensibly suggest as another alternative, the development
of such sites on the Mainland, with Japan to supply around 200 billion
yen worth of equipment. 2 s
In 1978, the PRC not only bought oil rigs from Hitachi, but also
purchased two underwater exploration ships and five oil recovery
vessels all for use in offshore drilling. 2" 9 Hitachi also received a request
for a computer specifically designed for geological prospecting, which
could be used to scan for oil in the continental shelf regions. This pro-
posed $4.3 million computer sale raises the tricky question of the
transfer of sensitive technology, since Hitachi must first secure the ap-
proval of COCOM. 2' 0
X. TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE PRC
A. Prototypes, Plant Importation, Licensing Arrangements
In the past, perhaps the most standard approach taken by China
in absorbing advanced technology was the utilization of the foreign
prototype model. At the conclusion of international industrial fairs
held on the Mainland, the Chinese would shrewdly purchase the
display models from foreign exhibitors, and proceed to manufacture
their own domestic versions without any outside assistance. Though a
cheap way of accepting Western technology the prototype procedure
was seriously flawed. Duplicating the most advanced technological
items would be an extraordinarily difficult task probably beyond
Chinese capabilities, since it demanded a sophisticated level of design
engineering, precision in parts manufacturing, and the acquisition of
the proper building materials. 24' Gradually the Chinese recognized the
inherently counterproductive aspect of the prototype method, which
only masked their own technical deficiencies. Fundamentally, a pro-
totype "by itself reveals only what was produced, not how it was pro-
duced."2 42 The imitator proves he can copy an existing model but does
nothing to stimulate his abilities to generate new technological designs
or processes.
238 CHINA NEWSLETTER 20 (December 1978).
239 Id. at 17-18 (September 1978).
240 Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist Areas of the NATO Con-
sultative Group in Brussels (includes all NATO countries except Iceland, while adding
Japan as a member).
241 Heymann, supra note 71, at 27.
242 Id.
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A more effective means of technology transfer was the plant impor-
tation approach. Traditionally on the basis of self-reliance, the PRC,
in importing comprehensive packages of plant assembly and equip-
ment, shunned the accompanying benefits of on-site consultation and
supervision.2 4- By denying themselves the continual technical services
of foreign experts the Chinese were perpetuating their backwardness in
the sphere of "management technology. 24 4 They were deprived of
those insights offered by foreign technicians concerning plant manage-
ment and production organization, which are gained only through ex-
perience. Preliminary indications in 1978 pointed to an attempt to cor-
rect this benighted policy. Acceptance of the full array of foreign
technical assistance seems to be an integral element of the proposed
Sino-Japanese cooperative ventures in the energy field. Plans for
Kuraray's artificial leather plant call for forty Japanese engineers in
charge of construction and technical guidance to be stationed in
China, while in return, fifty Chinese will be given technical training in
Japan.2 4 1 Part of the Japanese responsibility in the Marubeni-Japan
Gas ethylene plant project was the training of Chinese operators to
oversee the facility's computer system .246
After visiting the PRC in 1977, Norman Macrae, an editor of the
London Economist, decried the tendency of developing nations like
China to buy their way to industrial progress through complete plant
importation contracts, with one foreign party supplying all the
facilities and equipment. As an alternative, he recommended the im-
portation of "six or seven competing brands of foreign technology
within each Chinese industry, so that there can be experiment to find
what modified versions of which two or three are best-suited to Chinese
conditions. '2 47 Not only will this approach give the Chinese more
discretion and control over the adoption of foreign technology, but
also will lead to lower costs, since foreign companies will engage in
price slashing in order to attract PRC purchasers. In 1978, the PRC
took this advice to heart. As an example, most of the major Japanese
steelmakers were diversifying into a wide spectrum of projects, ranging
from the construction of new mills to the improvement of outmoded
existing facilities, involving a great amount of subcontracting. In the
color television assembly area, components were being supplied by
243 Id. at 28.
244 Id. at 31.
245 CHINA NEWSLETrER 12 (September 1978).
246 Id. at 13.
247 EcONOMIST, December 31, 1977, at 22.
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several different Japanese electronics firms, while a similar division of
labor also was employed in the building of petrochemical plants. The
ethylene plant deal entered into by a Mitsubishi-led consortium
graphically illustrated China's new insistence on separate purchases of
plant equipment and machinery. The Mitsubishi group was responsible
for the manufacturing of boilers and electrical equipment, Marubeni
and Japan Gas were to help supply chemical storage tanks, and
Ishikawajima-Harima would build compressors. 24"
Mr. Macrae also believed China should institute a licensing system
for the acquisition of new technology, since it is the "only way that
foreign companies can be persuaded to leave technicians in China with
an interest in getting a process working." 2 4 9 A foreign corporation
would grant the Chinese a license to use a certain technical process,
and agree to be partially repaid "according to the sales made of pro-
ducts from the process within China." 250 This type of economic incen-
tive will compel a foreign firm to provide the proper degree of plant
supervision. A concrete example of this approach was the license given
to the Chinese for the process of extracting butadiene (using natural
gas) as part of the Marubeni-Japan Gas ethylene plant agreement. 25'
Teng Hsiao-ping's product payback method also could have the same
desirable results as a licensing system-a completed plant's output
would be used to repay a foreign company for the plant technology
supplied. Evidence of this business strategy in operation can be gleaned
from Peking's encouragement of provincial efforts to introduce such
product payback schemes. 25 2
B. Patent Rights and COCOM Restrictions
One reason that foreign corporations favored selling complete
packages of technology to the PRC was the concern over the protection
of their patents. With the Chinese predilection for copying technology
in disregard of patent rights, foreigners viewed the "turnkey" project as
relatively immune from such pirating activity, since there was so much
technical information to be assimilated all at once.
Hostility toward the Western concept of patent law is deeply in-
grained in the PRC's political philosophy. Inventions are created by
248 CHINA NEWSLETTER 12 (September 1978).
249 EcONOMIST, December 31, 1977, at 22.
250 Id.
211 CHINA NEWSLETTER 13 (September 1978).
22 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., August 4, 1978, at 47,
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the revolutionary zeal of the masses and therefore are the property of
the state. Rejecting the principle of "private ownership of knowledge,"
an editorial in the People's Daily commented that "[i]t is not necessary
for us to regard the inventions and technological improvement of a
certain individual or a certain unit as personal property which deserves
protectionl This is different in nature from the so-called 'patent rights'
under the capitalistic 'system.
'213
In the PRC's infancy, provisional regulations closely paralleling
Western models established alienability of patent rights. However, by
1954, a schedule of monetary awards was introduced to replace the
earlier rules, and no mention was made of patent rights. Promulgation
in 1963 of the "Regulations on Awards for Inventions" and "Regula-
tions on Awards for Technical Improvements" totally ignored the per-
sonal property aspect of patents. A revised monetary compensation
plan was outlined, fixing the payment amount instead of having it
calculated as a particular percentage of an invention's production
value. 214 All inventions were treated alike with no recognition of their
different individual benefits.
Jen Chien-hsin's 1977 interview in the China Quarterly clearly in-
dicated that the new leadership in Peking was very sensitive to foreign
complaints about China's parasitic use of technical knowledge. He
hinted that the PRC was examining the possibility of registering
patents and also of subscribing to international patent conventions. In
an attempt to ease foreign anxieties, Jen stated that China would not
copy patents without specific authorization. Since individual business
contracts were signed by state-owned trading corporations, the Chinese
government would ensure that foreign patent rights were not
violated. 2 " Reiterating the respect the PRC had for foreign investors'
individual property rights, Jen argued that even though patents were
not currently registered, "[w]e solve the problem by putting a certain
clause into the contract. We protect rights, but the method of protec-
tion is different." 256 Jen was probably referring to those individual con-
tracts in China's foreign trade practice which had prohibitions on
technical knowledge being transferred to third parties. 257
252 Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People's Republic of China:
Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334, 341 (1978).
:54 Id. at 336-37.
" Heuser, supra note 84, at 165.
256 Id.
257 See Leng, supra note 57, at 795; Kim, supra note 58, at 613-14.
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More dramatic evidence of Peking's altered policy toward patents
has been the recent Japanese reports of Chinese intentions to enact a
new series of commerical laws in 1979 including a "patent act."25 8 The
proposed Chinese legislation appears to only protect foreign technical
knowledge and does not consider the question of domestic invention. If
Peking wants to stimulate and encourage the spirit of scientific ex-
perimentation and innovation within China, the 1963 "award" regula-
tions must be revised. As part of the Ten Year Plan, 800,000 new
scientists are to be trained. This goal could prove to be meaningless
unless this new generation is more amply rewarded for individual
technical improvements.
COCOM restrictions are intended to prevent the transfer to Com-
munist nations of technology which has military application. Japanese
exports to the PRC have been hampered by these curbs, especially at
the instigation of the United States, which provides Japan with so
much of its military security. Deliberations in COCOM are very time-
consuming and laborious because each country has the prerogative to
veto the sales of a fellow member.25 9 Acting in concert with several
European nations, Japan managed to get some fifty items removed
from the COCOM restrictive list in 1972.260 Japanese distaste for
COCOM trade roadblocks had already been exhibited in a 1969
judicial decision declaring the enforcement of COCOM regulations
through the Japanese foreign exchange control law as an illegal act.
Since the Diet had not passed any statute implementing the-COCOM
proscriptions, the foreign exchange control act, reasoned the court,
could not be used to circumvent this legal deficiency. 26'
A prominent case of COCOM's impact on Sino-Japanese trade was
the Japanese sale of large-scale computers to the Mainland, initially
ordered in October of 1976. Hitachi was to supply three computers
designed for meteorological observation, Before permitting the sale,
the United States forced Tokyo to accept three COCOM pre-
conditions: (1) reduction of the computer memory capacities; (2) the
creation of a safeguard system preventing diversion to military use; and
(3) the monitoring of computer operations through an inspection
system. Following negotiations with the Chinese, Hitachi was permitted
to reduce the storage capacity by cutting down on the data processing
258 N.Y. Times, December 9, 1978, § A, at 1.
219 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., October 6, 1978, at 57.
260 Henderson & Matsuo, supra note 90, at 64-65.
261 Id. at 65-66.
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speed of the computers, having the computers connected to the Tokyo
Meteorological Agency as part of the safeguard system, and dispatch-
ing its own employees to be on-site inspectors for three to four years.
The inspectors would report to COCOM any irregularities in computer
use. 2 Finally, after almost two and one-half years of tortuous discus-
sions, COCOM formally approved the transaction on February 8,
1978.
COCOM's rather labyrinthine procedures may not be as much a
hinderance to China's proposed purchase of a geological survey com-
puter from Hitachi. The United States has softened its attitude toward
the application of COCOM restrictions to exports bound for the PRC.
In 1978, Washington decided not to insist on COCOM authorization
for a $2.8 million sale of American geological prospecting equipment
to the Mainland. According to some Japanese sources, the United
States also may not ask for COCOM approval of IBM's planned sale of
a production management computer system for a turbofan plant in Shen-
yang.263 In light of equitable considerations, it could be difficult for the
United States to argue for full COCOM review of Hitachi's proposed sale.
Despite COCOM barriers, China was able even in the past to im-
port equipment with overt military potential. In 1975, Peking was
licensed by Rolls Royce to manufacture Spey engines designed for use
in fighter aircraft. Purchasing new weaponry is a vital part of the
PRC's current military modernization program. Peking has evinced in-
terest in buying from the French sophisticated missiles such as the
Crotale and Exocet, in acquiring the Franco-German HOT and
MILAN antitank missiles, and obtaining from the British the versatile
Harrier jump jet.2 6 4 Only recently, Washington has reversed its long-
standing policy against the sale by its allies of "defensive" arms to
China.2 6 5 It has been suggested that COCOM clearance will be waived
if the weapons to be sold are clearly in the "nonthreatening" category.
Already in 1978, the English were able to sell diesel engines for use in
Chinese coast guard vessels, without seeking the green light from
COCOM.2 6 6 A concern for Japanese trading interests is that the PRC
will repeat the mistakes of so many developing nations, by embarking
on an overly ambitious military spending campaign, thus diverting
funds away from industrial projects involving Japanese investment.
:62 Nihon Keizai, December 30, 1977, at 8.
263 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., July 7, 1978, at 37.
264 See Yeh, supra note 20, at 12; FAR EAST. EcON. REv., October 6, 1978,
at 55-P6.
265 Wash. Post, November 10, 1978, § A, at 33.
266 Id.
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XI. PRC's FINANCING TECHNIQUES
A. Traditional Methods
One of the problems faced in determining how the Chinese will
pay for their new lavish modernization program is their rather cryptic
and secretive approach to the whole issue. Details of the PRC's finan-
cial condition are scarce, and Peking has never revealed any com-
prehensive blueprints on the financing of its import plans. To the
Chinese, their financial standing in the world community is a sensitive
question. Chinese pride in being self-reliant makes it difficult for the
PRC to confess owing a debt to any foreign nation. In the past, the
PRC steadfastly refused offers of foreign aid, direct government loans,
and foreign investment through joint ventures, not wanting to emulate
the experiences of so many debt-riddled developing countries.
However, in 1978, the Chinese were extraordinarily receptive and
amenable to new methods of financing, with their thinking evolving
rapidly on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.
Statistics gathered by the Swiss-based Bank of International Set-
tlements (BIS) have been very useful in gauging the relative financial
position of China on the international level. BIS, which serves as the
clearinghouse for the central bankers of the industrialized nations (in-
cluding Japan), is able to extract lending figures from commercial
banks, revealing the debt situation in various countries. Liabilities in-
curred by members of BIS with the Bank of China (Peking's central
bank) increased from $1.4 billion in 1976 to $2.4 billion at the end of
September 1977.267 Compared to these reserves, China's foreign bank
borrowings were put at around $500 million. More unsettling is the
BIS estimate that 85.7% of this "debt" would come due in 1978.268
Among the credit techniques commonly employed by the Chinese
in their trade with Japan are mutual deposits of third country curren-
cies, the revised yen-yaun agreement of 1973, progress payment plans,
and deferred payment schemes (applicable to the import of plant
facilities and equipment under the LTTA), often relying on suppliers'
credit. Based on a fairly conservative figure of the PRC importing an
average of three billion dollars over the next few years, this would
make it imperative for China to at least double its present yearly ex-
261 Yeh, supra note 20, at 3.
266 FAR EAST. EcON. REV., September 22, 1978, at 35. There is also $499 million
more in "undispersed commitments," loans made to the Bank of China but not drawn
upon. U.S.-CHINA Bus. REV., September-October 1978, at 65.
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port earnings of seven billion dollars in order to continue using sup-
pliers' credit. 269 Suppliers' credit has been a favorite source of funds
for the Chinese, because in their view they have accumulated no debt.
Since the foreign supplier was charged with the responsibility of pro-
curing financing, he was regarded as the debtor. To be able to accept
delayed payments from the Chinese buyer, the foreign exporter would
obtain low interest rate credit from a bank, with the national govern-
ment often guaranteeing the bank from risks of nonpayment. 2 0 When
supplier's credit is tied in with a deferred payment plan, the seller is
usually given a down payment of around twenty percent and is paid at
regular intervals over a five year period, which only begins to run after
the imported plant facilities have been completed. 27' In reality, the
foreign supplier is providing a medium-term loan to the Chinese, who
have even agreed to pay moderate interest charges.
While deferred payment operations accounted for more than sixty
percent of all PRC plant financng in the 1972 to 1976 era, the rest of
the projects involved "progress payment" methods. First, came a twen-
ty percent down payment, with seventy percent of the total sum being
paid out as the equipment was being installed, and the final ten per-
cent being paid after the plant had functioned for one year.27 2 If used
extensively, progress payment deals could cause severe cash flow pro-
blems for a fiscally prudent country like China.
Until the August 18, 1972 yen-yuan agreement, Sino-Japanese
trade contracts were payable only in English pounds. Japanese discon-
tent over this arrangement grew as the PRC granted other Western
nations the right to deal in their own currencies. Japanese hardship,
caused by the weakening pound, was eased by the non-governmental
yen-yuan accord entered into by the Bank of China (BOC) and the
Bank of Tokyo. Yen and yuan were now acceptable currencies of pay-
ment, and the Japanese were willing to have their China trade
surpluses expressed in yuan instead of the stronger yen, so long as the
BOC would buy back the excess accumulation. 2 "3 The 1972 yen-yuan
pact was revised in August of the next year. In this new agreement the
importing party was given the option of choosing the currency of pay-
269 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., September 22, 1978, at 37.
270 Id., September 23, 1977, at 40.
211 Denny, Recent Developments in the International Financial Policies of the
People's Republic of China, 10 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 163, 178-79 (1975).
272 Denny & Surls, China's Foreign Financial Liabilities, U.S.-CHINA Bus. REv.,
March-April 1977, at 13, 17.
213 Henderson & Matsuo, supra note 90, at 62.
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ment, but in practice, yuan (or RMB) became the monetary standard
for all of Japan's exports to China and for eighty to ninety percent of
its imports from the PRC.
According to the terms of the 1973 yen-yuan settlement, the BOC
was given the privilege of unilaterally establishing the yen-yuan ex-
change rate, the "official rate," 27 4 controlling the yen account of the
BOC in the Foreign Exchange Bank of Japan, and the latter's yuan ac-
count in the BOC. Balances in both accounts were converted into
British pounds at the prevailing market rate, and could be used to pay
off contractual commitments in Sino-Japanese trade. The Japanese, by
not insisting on having their yuan deposits directly convertible into
yen, were continuing to deny themselves all the benefits of their cur-
rency.215 The PRC was further assisted by Japanese reluctance to draw
on their growing yuan account in the BOC. By not using these
amounts amassed by virtue of their favorable trade balance with the
Chinese, the Japanese were, in effect, giving the PRC temporary in-
terest free loans. 276
In addition to the yen-yuan procedure, the two countries also
employed mutual deposits of third nation currencies. It was not sur-
prising that this mechanism also allowed the PRC to gain more finan-
cial leverage. Deposits were made in the overseas branches of the Bank
of China and in individual Japanese banks. Generally, the amounts
placed by the Japanese in BOC branches greatly exceeded the
reciprocal sums deposited by the BOC in Japanese banks. In taking
advantage of the resultant discrepancy, the BOC could borrow the
surplus amount in its overseas branches to help pay off China's import
bill. It has been rumored that in late 1975, Japanese banks had amassed
a surplus balance of nearly $100 million in just the London office of
the BOC.
A variation on this mutual depositing technique was the deposit of
equivalent amounts of yen and yuan. Since the RMB (yuan) was a
non-convertible currency, the BOC could borrow the yen at no interest
while applying the RMB as collateral. 2' 8 Through these two types of
2'4 There also was an "arbitrated rate" determined by a complex system of cross-rates
among the RMB-pound, the dollar-pound and the yen-pound. If this rate dropped
below the "official rate," Japanese exporters could be hurt by the resulting devaluation
of the RMB, since they were using the yuan as their currency. Denny, supra note 271,
at 174.
2" Tsuchiya, supra note 1, at 245-46.
26 Denny, supra note 271, at 170.
277 Yeh, supra note 20, at 14.
278 Id.
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mutual depositing schemes the Chinese also were able to secure
another financial advantage. Often they were allowed to overdraw
their accounts at minimal interest rates, with the Japanese banks nor-
mally not placing any restrictions on the amount and duration of the
overdrafts.27 9
Despite these ingenious financing devices, China's future capacity
to absorb dramatic increases in its debt load, caused by enormous im-
port orders, is open to question. David Denny, a noted commentator
on Chinese financial affairs, felt that the PRC could maintain a rather
conservative repayment ratio of fifteen percent (as compared to the
country's net export earnings) in 1980, if about one billion dollars
worth of plants financed according to deferred payment schedules were
purchased annually, and if the volume of exports grew at a rate of ten
percent a year.2 80 His relative optimism was contingent upon there be-
ing no large-scale need for agricultural imports. 281 In a revised
estimate, Denny noted that the combined debt servicing on imports of
agricultural commodities and industrial plants would be only nine per-
cent in 1980, if a modest five percent was achieved in the years 1976
through 1980.282 Two factors should be pointed out-Denny only con-
sidered Chinese plant imports through 1976, and he assumed that the
PRC would only import one billion dollars a year in plants, which in
light of the LTTA, is too low a figure.
More current and somber analysis of the PRC's financing
capabilities was provided by the Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO). 283 The PRC's repayment commitments will exceed revenues
by almost $300 million in 1979 to 1981, based on a five year deferred
payment formula, the current prices of Chinese exports, and the
ordering of eight billion dollars worth of plant imports between 1978
and 1980. This situation would improve in 1982, when China would
enjoy a surplus of over $150 million, and this favorable trade balance
would continue into 1983 through 1985, based on expected increases in
the quantity of its LTTA exports. What might help resolve the early
cash-flow quandary for the PRC would be more generous financial terms,
i.e., a ten year deferred payment plan, and a five percent yearly
increase in price of leading export items.
2179 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., May 27, 1977, at 78.
280 Denny, supra note 271, at 180.
281 Denny felt that a 20% debt repayment ratio could be maintained after figur-
ing agricultural imports, but cautioned on the difficulty of holding this 20% line. Id.
262 Denny & Surls, supra note 272, at 18.
288 See CHINA NEWSLETTER 10-13 (June 1978), especially Table VII which
predicts the PRC's financing needs under the terms of the LTTA. Id. at 11.
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B. New Financial Arrangements for Purchases Under the LTTA
Japanese efforts to lighten China's debt burden under the LTTA
are constrained by the OECD's "gentlemen's agreement" on interest
rates for loans extended by government-affiliated financial institutions
to the developing world.28 4 Although these OECD guidelines are volun-
tary and are without enforcement procedures, Japanese freedom of ac-
tion has been severely inhibited by the United States. Washington con-
siders it especially important for Tokyo to observe the OECD limita-
tions because of the size of its foreign trade surplus. 2 s
After the signing of the LTTA, Tokyo offered several alternative
financial plans to the Chinese. Money could be lent by such govern-
ment organs as the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) and
the Japan Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) at interest rates below
OECD standards.2 86 Another approach would permit the Ex-Im Bank
to give direct financial assistance to Japanese importers of Chinese
goods in the form of advance payments. Under this method, a
Japanese importer of, for instance, crude oil would be provided with
funds at a low interest rate, and then turn the money over to the
Chinese seller as an advanced payment for the oil to be shipped.
Credit would be received by the Chinese seller, since the oil might not
be delivered to the buyer for quite some time. A portion of Japan's
bulging foreign reserves could be deposited with Chinese banks to be
used for import financing. 28' The foreign reserves passed on by the
government to individual Japanese institutions for deposit also could be
extended to Chinese businesses in the form of purely private credit,
and thus could be offered at interest rates below OECD minimums. 288
On ideological grounds, the Chinese, in the summer of 1978, were
still reluctant to support the OECD because it was an aid-dispensing
284 Medium-term loans of a two-to-five year duration made by Western nations to
China must carry a 7.25% annual interest rate, since the PRC is regarded as a
developing country, If the loan is for six-to-ten years, the interest rate becomes 7.5%
with a possibility that the deferral period can stretch up to twelve years for construc-
tion of steel plants and electrical power facilities. See id. at 12.
286 Mainichi Shimbun, February 13, 1978, at 1.
286 OECF loans are available at only a 3.5% to 5.5% yearly interest rate and
mature in thirty years with a ten year grace period. The OECD 7.25% rate can be
ignored by the OECF, since the latter is in the business of giving out foreign aid,
which is not governed by the OECD standards. However, the offers of funds from the
Ex-Im Bank with interest rates below 7.25% were in direct opposition to the OECD
guidelines, which are applicable to Ex-Im Bank operations.
28' Nihon Kogyo, February 20, 1978, at 1.
28 FAR EAST. ECON. REv., July 14, 1978, at 39.
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organization, and Ex-Im Bank funds were equaly tainted since accep-
tance of such monies would denote a government-to-government loan.
However, in talks with the British in August 1978, the PRC seemed
amenable to private bank-syndicated loans.2 "9
By the Fall of 1978, Chinese moderation in financial matters was in
full flower. In the September extension to the LTTA, the PRC ac-
cepted the OECD restriction on interest rates, thus capitulating to in-
ternational economic reality. Moreover, the PRC agreed in principle to
receive loans from the Ex-Im Bank. In a proposal proffered by the
Japanese in September, the borrowing was to be considered "commer-
cially based," allowing Peking to maintain the illusion that it was not a
direct government obligation. Credit would be in the 200 to 400 billion
yen range (one to two billion dollars), and would be given to the BOC
for oil and coal development, at a 6.25% annual interest rate on a
five-to-ten year repayment schedule. 290 Japan would not be violating
the 7.25% OECD rate because the Ex-Im Bank was ostensibly pro-
viding "import financing" - money devoted to the development of
Chinese national resources, and not to the paying off of Japanese im-
ported items.2 9 1 Troubled by the sharp rise in the yen, Peking rejected
the specifics of the plan, and demanded that United States dollars be
the medium for borrowing. Responding to Chinese pressure, Tokyo in-
vented a new Resources Development Dollar Fund financed by the Ex-
Im Bank. About one billion dollars would be channeled by the Bank
to those Japanese companies involved in overseas resource develop-
ment, e.g., coal mines in China. Interest rates for these loans would be
quite reasonable, around 6% for energy-related projects and 6.5% to
7% for other natural resources. 292
The Chinese continuing indecision over government-to-government
loans was illustrated in October of 1978, when two contradictory
statements were made within the course of two weeks. To a
distinguished British industrial delegation, Peking intimated that such
direct assistance would be acceptable at some future date, while
earlier, a mission of the EEC was told flatly that direct govenmental
loan assistance was still prohibited. 293 As for foreign aid, in a fall visit
289 Id., August 25, 1978, at 57-58. Peking had even suggested that the British
government should guarantee these private banks from the financial risks involved in a
syndicated loan deal in order to make such an arrangement more enticing to bankers.
190 Id., September 22, 1978, at 96.
291 Id.
2 Id., October 13, 1978, at 44.
290 Id., October 27, 1978, at 40, 43.
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to the Mainland, Mr. Inayama, one of the chief architects of the
LTTA, got the definite impression that the PRC was even con-
templating the use of Tokyo's OECF.2 94
Peking's supposed repugnance towards joint ventures gradually faded
in 1978. Witness the discussions with both Japanese and American oil
companies for cooperative enterprises in the Pohai Gulf area.2 95 Unam-
bigious signals came from the PRC in December 1978, when the
Japanese Trade Association was told that joint ventures would be
allowed.2 96 In the set-up envisioned by the Chinese, Japanese com-
panies would be held to a forty-nine percent ownership of the joint
venture, with the Chinese participants given the right to buy out the
Japanese investors over a ten year period.
In December of 1978, details of the Nippon Steel plant agreement
for the mill at Paoshan were released. A remarkable feature of the
deal was Peking's readiness to pay in cash. 297 This was in line with
previous 1978 Chinese financial arrangements concluded with the
Japanese. Some Japanese sinologists surmised that Peking's eagerness to
spend hard currency could be attributed to a surplus of around two
billion dollars in its balance of payment position. 298 One Japanese
trader predicted that this Chinese practice cannot continue for long, as
the Mainland's need for investment funds will be $600 billion in the
next few years, and it is unlikely that Chinese exports will provide
more than $100 billion. 299
Then why is China expending so much of its precious surplus at
this stage? It simply could be a matter of timing. All the details of the
proposed new financial vehicles for Sino-Japanese trade have not been
completely worked out, so in the meantime, cash will be used. For
both political and psychological reasons, Peking realizes that the
modernization movement must show intangible results immediately,
and that interminable negotiations over financial terms have to be
avoided. By offering easy financing in the initial period of moderniza-
tion, China enhances its reputation for fiscal reliability, which would
tend to create a bandwagon effect among foreign investors.
294 Id., October 13, 1978, at 45.
295 According to the Japan External Trade Organization, as of November 1, 1978,
other tentative joint ventures between Japan and China were planned for the coal min-
ing, electrical power, nuclear power and onshore oil development sectors. CHINA
NEWSLETTER 21 (December 1978).
296 N.Y. Times, December 9, 1978, § A, at 31.
297 Id., December 6, 1978, § D, at 16.
298 Id.
299 Id., December 9, 1978, § A, at 31.
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Athough China is financially vulnerable, it is not without bargain-
ing power. Complaining about the disturbing rise in the value of the
yen, Peking has threatened:
Plant exports from Japan to China are quickly losing their com-
petitive power as to prices, when compared with plants manufactured
in Europe. Unless Japan realizes the easing of conditions for the ex-
tending of deferred-payment loans . . . it will become difficult to
carry out the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Agreement. 00
At present, the West is enamored by the idea of trading with China,
and as long as this fierce competition among the United States, Japan
and the EEC continues, the PRC should be able to attain better finan-
cial terms.
XII. SINO-JAPANESE TRADE AND GLOBAL COMPETITION
For both countries the LTTA channel of trade is not indispen-
sable. From the Japanese point of view, although they are the PRC's
biggest single customer, the size of the market pales when compared to
the product quantities exported by Japan to the United States and
Western Europe. Japan's economy is geared to the production of
sophisticated technological items on an enormous scale, which at this
juncture in its development China can only absorb in limited amounts.
An interesting comparison can be drawn between the volume of
Sino-Japanese and Japan-Taiwan trade. While in the 1966 to 1975
period trade with the Mainland exceeded $14.3 billion with Japan earn-
ing a $2.4 billion surplus, in the same years Japan had a $5.2 billion
favorable balance of trade with Taiwan out of a total volume of $13.5
billion.5 0' In the following two years the amount of Japanese business
transacted with Taipei exceeded the trade done with Peking.30 2 Even
in the first half of 1978, when Sino-Japanese trade recorded an all-time
high, Japanese commercial activity with Taiwan surpassed this level by
almost $100,000.3s Previous post-normalization period attempts by the
00 Mainichi Shimbun, April 1, 1978, at 7. Apparently, because of its shortage of
foreign exchange funds as well as its decision to lower development goals, Peking
abruptly suspended in late February 1979 over two billion dollars worth of contracts
for plant equipment with Japanese companies, most notably Nippon Steel Corporation.
Kyodo (Tokyo), February 28, 1979; id., March 2, 1979.
301 G. HSIAO, supra note 2, at 64.
802 See FAR EAST. ECON. REv., June 24, 1977, at 61, for the 1976 figures; see
FREE CHINA REV., March 1978, at 38, for the 1977 statistics; cf. note 3 supra.
303 STATISTICAL BuREAu, EXECUTIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NATIONAL CON-
DITIONS 16 (1978); cf note 4 supra.
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PRC to dissuade Tokyo from trading so extensively with Taipei have
not had a dramatic negative impact on the volume of Japan-Taiwan
trade. Especially now, when China is so anxious for Japanese
technology, it is unlikely that China will be very concerned about
Tokyo's flourishing commerce with Taipei.
On the other hand, Japan will encounter more and more competi-
tion from other industrialized nations in the struggle to gain a promi-
nent foothold in the Chinese market. The leadership in Peking will
discern the folly of relying too heavily on any single trading partner for
most of its imports. No nation has a monopoly on the successful pro-
duction of advanced technology. With so many eager foreign suitors,
China has the enviable opportunity to select only the best plants and
equipment and obtain these at reasonable prices. Its bargaining posi-
tion vis-d-vis Japan was certainly increased by the April 1978 trade
agreement concluded with the EEC, which granted the PRC most
favored nation treatment and lowered tariff barriers.304 By 1978, the
EEC countries' percentage share of Chinese imports was nearly equal
to Japan's, with West Germany and France as the leaders. 30" In the
first half of 1978, the amount of EEC exports to the Mainland record-
ed an astronomical 125.2% jump over the same period in 1977.06
Very disquieting from the Japanese perspective was that most of this
growth came in the heavy industry sector.
In the summer of 1978, Japanese petrochemical firms had lost out
in competitive bidding with their West German counterparts on several
large China projects.307 In addition, German and British interests were
engaged in the modernization of the PRC's coal mines. The British
also were getting involved in the power generation industry and hoping
to construct iron and steel plants, 308 and the Dutch were to provide
two-to-three billion dollars worth of harbor facilitiesA"9 Late in 1978,
the French made the most significant move by concluding a long-term
trade accord with the PRC, valued at $13.6 billion. For the European
competitors of Japan, the relaxation of COCOM restrictions will give
them a new method of improving the volume of their China trade. In
addition, through the sales of defense-related equipment they will pro-
bably be able to generate greater non-military business.
804 Yeh, supra note 20, at 18.
s00 CHINA NEWSLETT-ER 23 (June 1978).
06 Id. at 2 (December 1978).
807 Id. at 7 (September 1978).
308 See ECONOMIST, October 14, 1978, at 115, for an industry-by-industry review
of foreign investment and commercial activity in the PRC during 1978.
809 N.Y. Times, December 6, 1978, § D, at 16.
Vol. 11:267
SINOJAPANESE TRADE
Most definitely now, after the recent normalization of relations
with the PRC, the United States will become a major competitor with
the Japanese in the search for Chinese markets. Even before normaliza-
tion, American companies were exploring the possibilities of develop-
ing the Pohai Gulf offshore oil deposits, Sperry Rand and IBM were
selling computer systems to the PRC, Boeing was to deliver 747's to the
Mainland, and two hotel chains, the Intercontinental and the Hyatt,
were engaged to build new tourist facilities in China.31 0
In spite of Western competition, Japan's share of the China trade
will always be substantial considering its geographical proximity to the
Mainland, the intrinsic quality and variety of its industrial goods, and
the traditional cultural ties linking the two nations.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Spurred on by the terms of the LTTA, Sino-Japanese commercial
relations are entering a new era of unprecedented prosperity and ex-
pansion. For the moment, ideological barriers to the modernization
impulse are being conveniently ignored in Peking. In the area of cor-
porate financing, the PRC has demonstrated interest in promoting
joint ventures in order to more rapidly develop natural resources. To
achieve industrialization, exports of manufactured goods will have to
be encouraged. A harbinger of things to come could be the use of
Shumchun in Canton Province as a testing ground for joint export ven-
tures and as a model export -processing zone."' Acknowledging the role
of objective international standards in trade relations, Peking has of-
fered to promulgate new commercial laws protecting foreign investors
and especially their patent rights. The year 1978 saw the Mainland
basically announce its intentions to be a full fledged member of the in-
ternational financial community. Although still not irrevocably com-
mitted to accepting direct government loans or foreign aid, there are
indications suggesting that official Chinese requests for these forms of
assistance will come in the near future. The PRC has already con-
tacted the United Nations Development Programme, which is a major
force in distributing aid to the developing world.3 1s It will not be sur-
prising to find Peking seeking admission to international financial in-
stitutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Membership in these
global bodies would have two important effects-it would be a symbol
SlO Id.
311 FAR EAST. EcON. REv., August 18, 1978, at 51.
"12 Wash. Post, November 15, 1978, § A, at 1.
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of China's financial maturity, and Peking would gain access to more
sources of easy financing.
China's remarkable desire to learn the virtues of Western
capitalism is particularly strong in the economic organization area. In-
centive, profit and productivity have all entered the lexicon of Chinese
economic thinkers. In order to fulfill the ambitious goals of the Ten
Year Plan, the system of economic management must be rationalized
and centralized. High productivity is not a result of proper political
thought but is dependent on the methods of economic planning cur-
rently superior in the West-the proletariat must pay heed to the
"bourgeoisie" in a capitalistic country because they "consciously do
things according to objective economic law. '3 13 It is in this field that
the PRC can especially profit from the Japanese experience, since
Japan was able to achieve its astonishing metomorphosis in the post-
World War II period through the assimilation of Western management
techniques.
Prospects for Sino-Japanese trade will be affected by several
domestic constraints on China's modernization program. China's
transportation network, whether it be railroads or port facilities, is in-
adequate for the purpose of distributing effectively a staggering influx
of imported goods. Doubts have been raised by the Japanese about the
quality of China's oil and coal supplies, which are relied on to bring in
much needed foreign exchange. It will be no simple task both
technically to develop new reserves of energy such as offshore oil
deposits or new coal mines. China could be caught in a vicious
economic vise-the money spent on modernizing its export industries
like oil and coal will be so great that the earnings from these products
will not match the development costs.
Though committed to the encouragement of Sino-Japanese trade,
JETRO has examined the domestic situation in China with a dispas-
sionate and skeptical eye. As a general rule of thumb, Peking will have
to invest domestic funds equal to three times the value of its
imports.31 4 Such a debt burden will mean the goals of modernization
inevitably will clash with the PRC's sense of fiscal conservatism. China
will have to reconcile the different aims of the Four Modernizations
plan. Internal tensions could be produced by a scramble for scarce
resources. With Western powers freed of many COCOM limitations,
the Chinese military's appetite for weaponry could become insatiable.
31' FAR EAST. ECON. REv., October 27, 1978, at 38.
314 CHINA NEWSLETTER 9 (June 1978).
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Moreover, the agricultural basis of the economy is still shaky. Bad
harvests over the last two years have compelled the PRC to import
large quantities of wheat.31s This chronic inability to feed a rapidly ex-
panding population certainly could siphon off much needed invest-
ment from the industrial sector, and further impede China's moder-
nization drive.
To preach technical development as a part of the Four Moderniza-
tions plan could also lead to the creation of a "new class" as well as fis-
sions in the social structure.
[A]ccelerated industrialization through introduction of foreign
technology and industrial plants is likely to result in preferential
treatment for researchers and engineers directly involved as well as
the technocrats involved in promoting the industrial projects, thereby
expanding the disparity between the intellectual class and the worker-
farmer class, and between industrial cities and farming villages.316
Most fundamentally, there is no assurance that the current leadership
will survive to see the Four Modernizations program firmly implanted
in China, or that it will not modify the goals of the Four Moderniza-
tions campaign when faced with growing internal discontent and op-
position.
What conceivably will have the most far-reaching effect on Sino-
Japanese trade is the philosophical readjustments already made by the
present Chinese government regarding the concept of self-reliance. In
the past decades, the PRC's defiant brand of political independence
and economic autarchy was immensely appealing to many developing
nations."' The emphasis on indigenous technology and labor-intensive
techniques, the refusal of foreign aid, the focus on self-financing as a
way to "de-link" China from reliance on Western nations, and a
decentralized system of economic decision-making were all tenets of the
"' Indications are that the 1978 grain crop was only a 10 million ton improve-
ment over the disappointing 1977 total of 285 million tons. From the United States
alone in 1978, China purchased 4.5 million tons of corn and wheat at a cost of more
than $500 million. Wash. Post, November 14, 1978, § A, at 18.
316 CHINA NEWSLETTER 9 (June 1978).
"I See, e.g., C. KINDLEBERGER & B. HERRICK, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 370-71
(1977), for a discussion of China's alternative model of economic development. For a
discussion of the admiration of the Chinese concept of self-reliance, see M. HA%, THE
POVERTY CURTAIN: CHOICES FOR THE THIRD WORLD 72-74 (1976). For the suggestion
that the PRC's notion of self-reliance may be outmoded, see Terrill, China and the
World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence?, 55 FOR. AFF. 295-305 (1977).
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traditional PRC notion of self-reliance, which have now been amended
or discarded by the Teng-Hua leadership. Self-reliance has proven to
be a dynamic principle, ever-changing to meet the new special needs
of the Chinese people. China's present course of industrialization and
technological improvement may be the decisive turning point away
from a no longer operative form of self-reliance. Isolation both
culturally and economically is not feasible in a world becoming in-
creasingly interdependent. It is possible that the current Peking regime
has accurately assessed the mood of the Chinese nation, and that its
bold experiment with modernization, while amendable, will not be
reversible.
